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I. INTRODUCTION
Only six years have passed since DNA evidence was first admitted in
a criminal trial in this country., Since that time, DNA evidence has
engendered controversy, its scientific reliability and legal applicability
debated by both the scientific and legal communities. 2 DNA evidence
has been acclaimed as "the greatest single advance in the search for
truth, conviction of the guilty, and acquittal of the innocent since the
advent of cross-examination" 3 and attacked as an unreliable and un-
proven scientific technique that turns "courtrooms into laboratories
and defendants into guinea pigs."4
In Minnesota, the debate has engaged both the legislature and the
courts. The Minnesota Legislature, in 1989, expressly declared that
the results of DNA analysis and statistical population frequency evi-
dence were admissible in a civil or criminal trial.5 Minnesota courts,
however, refused to admit evidence showing a statistical match be-
tween the DNA of a defendant and the DNA found at the crime
1. Forensic DNA evidence was first found admissible in Andrews v. State, 533 So.
2d 841, 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), rev. denied, 542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1989). DNA
evidence was previously found admissible in England in 1987. See infra note 47 and
accompanying text.
2. For an excellent discussion of the current debate, including recommendations,
see COMMITrEE ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUN-
CIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992).
3. LORNE T. KIRBY, DNA FINGERPRINTING: AN INTRODUCTION XV (1990) (paraphras-
ing People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (Albany County Ct. 1988)).
4. Janet C. Hoeffel, Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientic Evi-
dence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REv. 465, 467 (1990).
5. MINN. STAT. §§ 634.25, 634.26 (1992) (codifying Act of Aug. 1, 1989, ch. 290,
art. 4, §§ 18,19, 1989 Minn. Laws 1624). These statutes provide:
In a civil or criminal trial or hearing, the results of DNA analysis, as defined in
section 299C.155, are admissible in evidence without antecedent expert testi-
mony that DNA analysis provides a trustworthy and reliable method of identi-
fying characteristics in an individual's genetic material upon a showing that
the offered testimony meets the standards for admissibility set forth in the
Rules of Evidence.
MINN. STAT. § 634.25 (1992).
In a civil or criminal trial or hearing, statistical population frequency evidence,
based on genetic or blood test results, is admissible to demonstrate the frac-
tion of the population that would have the same combination of genetic mark-
ers as was found in a specific human biological specimen. "Genetic marker"
means the various blood types or DNA types that an individual may possess.
MINN. STAT. § 634.26 (1992).
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scene. 6 This debate led to several legislative proposals for a constitu-
tional amendment requiring the admission of relevant statistical evi-
dence.7 In April 1994, the Minnesota Supreme Court responded by
lifting the ban on the previously excluded DNA statistical evidence.8
In order to better understand this debate, this Comment will take an
in-depth look at forensic DNA evidence. Part II examines the theories
and background of DNA evidence and the methodology used to isolate
and identify DNA. Part III sets out the tests used by state and federal
courts to determine the admissibility of DNA evidence. Part IV identi-
fies which courts admit and which do not admit forensic DNA evi-
dence and the reasons for their decisions. Part IV also examines
Minnesota's prior and current positions on DNA evidence. Part V pro-
vides a brief summary of the status of DNA evidence admissibility.
II. DNA IDENTIFICATION ANALYSIS
A. The Theory
1. DNA Composition and Structure
The human body is composed of approximately 100 trillion cells.9
Each cell serves as a "microfactory," taking in raw materials, producing
new substances, and disposing of wastes. 10 Each cell also has the ability
to replicate itself, using a "blueprint" found within the nucleus of the
cell.11 This unique blueprint is called deoxyribonucleic acid or DNA.
Within the cell nucleus, DNA is packed into structures called chro-
mosomes. 12 Each human cell contains twenty-three pairs of chromo-
6. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 428-29 (Minn. 1989) (admitting the test
results but not the statistical evidence because of the danger that the jury will use the
evidence as a measure of the probability of the defendant's guilt or innocence). See also
State v.Johnson, 498 N.W.2d 10, 15 (Minn. 1993); State v. Nielsen, 467 N.W.2d 615, 620
(Minn. 1991).
7. See, e.g., S. 1871, 78th Leg., 1993-94 Reg. Sess. § 12 (1994) which proposes:
"Sec. 12. Statistical frequency evidence based on deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing,
including the fraction of the population having the same combination of genetic char-
acteristics, shall be admissible, if relevant, in any judicial proceeding." See infra part
IV.C for a more detailed discussion of Minnesota's treatment of forensic DNA identifi-
cation analysis.
8. State v. Bloom, No. C9-94-55, 1994 WL 169980, at *1 (Minn. Apr. 29, 1994).
9. KiL.BY, supra note 3, at 8.
10. Id.
11. Id. The nucleus is a membrane-bound structure found within most cells. The
nucleus contains an individual's hereditary information and acts as the control center
of cell function. JEFFREYJ.W. BAYER & GARLAND E. ALLEN, THE STUDY OF BIOLOGY G-18
(3d ed. 1978).
12. Dan L. Burk, DNA Fingerprinting: Possibilities and Pitfalls of a New Technique, 28
JuRiMETRICSJ. 455, 457 (1988). The sum total of genetic information found within the
chromosomes is called the genome. This genetic information determines an individ-
ual's physical characteristics. Id.
19941
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somes' 3 within its nucleus.14 One half of each pair of chromosomes is
provided by each parent at the time of conception.15 Each chromo-
some contains two parallel strands16 of DNAjoined in such a way as to
resemble a twisted ladder or zipper.17 Linking the two strands are
pairs of molecules called bases.18 These base pairs form the rungs of
the ladder or the teeth of the zipper.19
Four types of bases are found in DNA: adenine, guanine, cytosine,
and thymine. 20 DNA base pairing is complementary and specific; ade-
nine pairs only with thymine and guanine pairs only with cytosine. 21
In order, therefore, for a single DNA strand to pair with a second DNA
strand, each base along the first strand must be complementary to its
matching base on the second strand.22
2. DNA Function
DNA has two distinct functions. The first is to serve as a blueprint
for assembling individual amino acids into proteins.23 The sequence
of bases found on the DNA molecule determines which amino acids
13. Technically, each cell nucleus contains 22 matched pairs of autosomal, or non-
sex, chromosomes and two sex chromosomes, for a total of 46 chromosomes. ImY,
supra note 3, at 8.
14. DNA is found in all cells that contain a nucleus. Certain cells, such as red
blood cells, do not have a nucleus and, therefore, do not contain DNA. William
Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic Identifica-
tion Tests, 75 VA. L. REv. 45, 61 n.76 (1989).
15. KaRBv, supra note 3, at 8.
16. The strands are composed of sugar and phosphate molecules. Thompson &
Ford, supra note 14, at 62. The sugar molecule is a five-carbon or pentose sugar known
as deoxyribose. BAKER & ALLEN, supra note 11, at 612.
17. Burk, supra note 12, at 457. It was the Englishman, Dr. Francis Crick, and his
American colleague, Dr. James Watson, who first developed the model for the DNA
molecule in the 1950s. According to the model, two strands of DNA are wound into a
right-handed double helix. Emic E. CONN & P.K. STUMPF, OUTLIas OF BIOCHEMisrRY
130 (4th ed. 1976). See alsoJ.D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic
Acids: A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171 Sci. 737, 737 (1953).
18. CoNNm & STUMPF, supra note 17, at 737. There are approximately three billion
base pairs in a human DNA molecule. Barry W. Duceman, DNA Analysis: Scientific and
Legal Aspects, 2 Atz. LJ. Sci. & TECH. 53, 57 (1992).
19. Burk, supra note 12, at 457.
20. KRBav, supra note 3, at 9. The bases are referred to by their first letters: A, G, C,
and T. Id.
21. Burk, supra note 12, at 457.
22. Id. A double-stranded DNA fragment could be represented as follows:
-A-G-C-C-G-C-T-T-C-A-A-C-T-A-G-T-
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
-T-C-G-G-C-G-A-A-G-T-T-G-A-T-C-A-
23. Kj. B, supra note 3, at 11.
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will bejoined together to form a particular protein.2 4 The sequence of
bases that controls the assembly of one protein is called a gene. 25
While the genes for most proteins are the same within a given spe-
cies, certain genes occur in different forms in different individuals.26
These genes are known as polymorphic genes,27 and their location on
the DNA molecule is called a polymorphic site or locus. 28 When com-
paring individuals, about 99.9% of the DNA molecules are identical.29
But since each DNA molecule contains over three billion base pairs, a
0.1% difference translates to about three million base pair differences
in any given individual.30 Because of this variability, no two individu-
als, with the exception of identical twins, will have identical DNA.31
The second DNA function is to serve as a template in cell reproduc-
tion.32 Before a cell can divide, a copy of the existing cell's DNA mole-
cule must be made for the new cell.33 During the replication process,
each DNA molecule "unzips" into two parent strands.34 Each parent
strand then serves as a template for the synthesis of a corresponding
24. ARTHUR J. VANDER ET AL., THE MECHANISMS OF BODY FUNCTION 51 (3d ed.
1980). Proteins are the building blocks that form the structure of most organs in the
body. Proteins also play a critical role in almost all chemical interactions occurring in
the body. Id. at 35-36.
25. Id. at 51. The sequence of bases can be compared to a written language such as
English. The letters are arranged in specific sequences to form words and sentences.
In the DNA molecule there are only four letters, A, G, C, and T; each letter corresponds
to one of the four bases. A DNA "word" consists of a three-base sequence or triplet.
Each triplet signifies an amino acid. A DNA "sentence" (or gene) is a sequence of
triplets (or "words") that specify the amino acids for a particular protein. Id. at 51-52.
For example, the triplet "TrC" codes for the amino acid lysine. CorNN & STUMPF, supra
note 17, at 537.
26. KIRBaY, supra note 3, at 24-26.
27. Polymorphism simply means that a basic'structure (such as a gene) is able to
assume different forms. One example of a polymorphism is the human ABO blood
group system. Instead ofjust one blood type, there are four: 0, A, B, and AB. Id. at 24-
25. The various forms of the polymorphic genes are called alleles. If many alleles exist
for a polymorphic site, the site is referred to as a hypervariable site or locus. Duceman,
supra note 18, at 59.
28. KIRBv, supra note 3, at 24. The terms locus and site can be used
interchangeably.
29. Duceman, supra note 18, at 59.
30. Id. These base pair differences occur at the polymorphic sites in the DNA mol-
ecule. Id.
31. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 61.
32. KRBY, supra note 3, at 13. Cells reproduce by dividing. One parent cell be-
comes two identical daughter cells, each containing the same quantity of genetic mate-
rial as the parent cell. Reproductive cells are the exception to this rule. One
reproductive parent cell divides to produce four eggs or sperm, each containing one-
half the genetic material of the parent. Id. at 327. At conception, the quantity of ge-
netic material is made whole in the embryo. Id. at 13.
33. Id. at 13.
34. Id. at 13, 16.
1994] 1067
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daughter strand.3 5 The two resulting DNA molecules are identical to
each other with each molecule consisting of one parent strand and
one daughter strand.3 6
Since all cells are ultimately derived from one cell, the fertilized egg,
all cells in the body contain identical DNA.37 For example, DNA taken
from an individual's saliva is the same as that found in the blood or
semen.38 And except for rare mutations which may occur within the
DNA sequence, DNA remains constant throughout a person's life-
time.3 9 These qualities, along with the fact that no two persons have
identical DNA, provide the basis for the DNA identification analysis. 40
B. The Methodology
1. Background
DNA identification analysis41 is the process of isolating and identify-
ing certain segments of the DNA molecule. 42 The technique was de-
veloped for, and continues to be used by, the scientific community as
part of the study of human genetics. 43 The foundation for DNA identi-
fication analysis was established in 1980 with the discovery that the
same DNA segment has different lengths in different individuals.44
The analysis technique was first used in 1985 to identify matching sam-
ples of human DNA. 4 5
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. While each nucleus contains a complete DNA blueprint for the entire body, no
cell uses the entire blueprint. Each cell uses only those sections of DNA needed to
perform that cell's particular function. Burk, supra note 12, at 457.
38. KaRBi, supra note 3, at 1.
39. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 62.
40. Kgary, supra note 3, at 1.
41. DNA identification analysis is also referred to as DNA testing, DNA identity
testing, DNA profiling, DNA fingerprinting, DNA typing, and DNA genotyping. Id.
42. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 63.
43. Burk, supra note 12, at 455.
44. KIRBY, supra note 3, at 2.
45. Lisa B. Hansen, Note, Stemming the DNA Tide: A Case for Quality Control Guide-
lines, 16 HAMLINE L. REv. 211, 213 (1992). Identification was made by Dr. AlecJeffreys,
a British geneticist and originator of the DNA fingerprinting technique. BuREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJusricE, FORENSIC DNA ANALYsis: IssuEs 4 (1991). See
Alec J. Jeffreys et al., Hypervariable "Minisatellite" Regions in Human DNA, 314 NATURE 67
(1985).
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Forensic DNA identification analysis46 was first used in England in
1987.47 In the United States, DNA evidence was first admitted in court
to identify a criminal suspect in 1988.48 Forensic DNA identification
analysis is also used in paternity testing4 9 and identification of missing
persons. 50
2. Analysis Techniques
DNA identification analysis is performed by government agencies
and several private firms.51 The analysis techniques most commonly
used in forensic DNA testing are the Restriction Fragment Length Pol-
ymorphism (RFLP) analysis and the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)
amplification (also called the Allele Specific Probe analysis).52 RFLP is
the more widely used method and is the one currently used by the FBI
laboratories.53
46. The DNA identification analysis discussed in this Comment is the forensic ap-
plication of DNA identification analysis as opposed to its scientific application. Some
examples of the scientific application include: tumor and disease analysis, identification
of microorganisms, family trait identification, paternity testing, determination of detri-
mental or valuable traits in livestock, studies of evolution, wildlife poaching, and plant
breeding. See generally KiRBY, supra note 3, at 226-53.
47. Duceman, supra note 18, at 56. The English case, a serial rape and murder, is
described in Joseph Wambaugh's, THE BLOODING (1989). During the criminal investi-
gation, one suspect was exonerated when it was found that his DNA did not match the
DNA obtained from the crime scene. After the suspect was exonerated, the police took
blood samples from more than 5000 males in three surrounding villages before finding
a DNA match. FoRENsic DNA ANALysis, supra note 45, at 8. An English court was also
the first in the world to convict on DNA evidence. In November 1987, Robert Melias
was convicted of rape and sentenced to eight years in jail. Id. at 4 n.8.
48. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 843, 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), review
denied, 542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1989). The defendant was convicted of aggravated battery,
sexual battery, and armed burglary after admission of DNA evidence. The admissibility
of the DNA evidence and the conviction were affirmed on appeal. Id. at 842.
49. KiRav, supra note 3, at xv; FoRENSIc DNA ANALYsis, supra note 45, at 7.
50. KiRBw, supra note 3, at 228-29.
51. Hansen, supra note 45, at 215 n.40. See also FoRENsic DNA ANALYSis, supra note
45, at 10 (indicating that the FBI and various states have forensic laboratories in
operation).
The private firms, each established in 1987, are Lifecodes Corporation, Tarrytown,
New York; Cellmark Diagnostic Corporation, Germantown, Maryland; and Cetus Cor-
poration, Emeryville, California. Lifecodes and Cellmark use the RFLP analysis tech-
nique. See infa part II.B.2.a. for a discussion of the RFLP analysis technique.
Lifecodes uses four single-locus probes, each of which produces one or two bands.
Cellmark uses single-locus probes for criminal identifications and multi-locus probes
for paternity cases. Cetus developed the PCR amplification technique. See Duceman,
supra note 18, at 56 n.19. See infta part II.B.2.b. for a discussion of the PCR amplifica-
tion technique. See also Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 48-50.
52. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 64.
53. Hansen, supra note 45, at 215.
1994] 1069
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Both methodologies start with a sample collection. 54 A sample can
be from either fresh or dried tissue. 55 Fresh tissue includes whole
blood, scrapings from the inner cheek surface, semen, and hair folli-
cles.56 Dried samples include blood and semen stains, tooth pulp, and
bone marrow.5 7 Autopsy specimens can also be used as a DNA
source. 58
Once the specimen is collected, the test used depends on the
amount and quality of the available sample.5 9 While the PCR test re-
quires far less biological material than does an RFLP analysis, the PCR
test results are less specific. 60 The PCR test also relies on newer tech-
nology that is less well-accepted by both the scientific community and
the courts.61
54. Samples are taken from the victim and crime scene and a blood sample is taken
from a suspect. Taking a blood sample from a suspect or defendant without the indi-
vidual's permission has raised constitutional questions of due process and self-incrimi-
nation. Suzanne H. Stenson, Comment, Admit It! DNA Fingerprinting is Reliable, 26
Hous. L. REv. 677, 696-97 (1989). However, the United States Supreme Court gener-
ally holds that such actions are constitutional. Id. For instance, police may determine
an unconscious person's intoxication level through blood samples taken without a war-
rant. See, e.g., Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435-38 (1954) (finding that such tests
are common and minimally intrusive). The Court has also held that blood samples may
be taken without a warrant if the situation involves exigency and probable cause. See,
e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768-70 (1966).
55. KIRBY, supra note 3, at 51.
56. Id. at 51.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. FORENSIC DNA ANAL'sis, supra note 45, at 4. RFLP analysis requires at least 10
to 50 nanograms (one billionth of a gram) of DNA. KRno, supra note 3, at 127. One
milliliter of fresh whole blood or a stain larger than the size of a dime is generally
needed to provide the minimum amount of DNA. Id. at 52. PCR amplification analysis
can be used for samples that are smaller, even as small as one cell. Id. at 78, 127.
60. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 50. RFLP analysis yields a series of bands
whose probability of occurrence is calculated from population frequency data. KRBy,
supra note 3, at 164-68. RFLP analysis utilizes actual DNA extracted from the biological
sample tested. Id. at 2.
PCR analysis yields a series of dots that indicate whether a particular allele is pres-
ent or absent in the sample DNA. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 50. PCR analysis
utilizes DNA that is chemically multiplied from a biological sample containing too little
DNA mass for RFLP analysis. Id. See also infra part II.B.2.b. for a description of the
PCR amplification test.
61. DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 70 (explaining that PCR has not yet
achieved full acceptance in the forensic setting). DNA evidence based on the PCR test
has been admitted thus far in only five states. New Jersey, State v. Williams, 599 A.2d
960, 968 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991); Ohio, State v. Penton, No. 9-91-25, 1993 WL 102507, at
*5 (Ohio Ct. App. April 7, 1993); Oregon, State v. Lyons, 863 P.2d 1303, 1311 (Or. Ct.
App. 1993); Texas, Clarke v. State, 813 S.W.2d 654, 655 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); Virginia,
Spencer v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621 (Va. 1990). See infra note 300 for a
listing of states that admit DNA evidence.
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a. RFLP Analysis
The goal of RFLP analysis is to cleave the DNA molecule at certain
target sites and identify any resulting fragments that contain key
polymorphic segments. 62 The analysis produces a print consisting of a
pattern of visible bands.63
i. Extraction
The first step in the analysis is to extract the DNA from the tissue
sample.64 In this part of the process, the sample is subjected to chemi-
cal and enzymatic processes which break open the cells, remove any
contaminating substances, and release the DNA.65
ii. Fragmentation
Next, the extracted DNA molecule is cut into smaller segments by
protein molecules called restriction enzymes. 66 These enzymes recog-
nize a specific base sequence,67 or restriction site, along the DNA mol-
ecule and cut the molecule at that site.68 The location of these
restriction sites and the resulting DNA fragment lengths produced by
the cleavage differ among individuals.69
62. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 64.
63. Id. at 48.
64. Id. at 65.
65. Id.; see also KIrsy, supra note 3, at 55.
66. Burk, supra note 12, at 457. There are hundreds of restriction enzymes; each
one recognizes and cleaves a different base sequence. KIRBY, supra note 3, at 23.
67. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of base
sequences.
68. Burk, supra note 12, at 457.
69. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 67-68. The difference in fragment length
is due to the existence of "minisatellites" located between restriction enzyme sites.
Minisatellites consist of a number of repeated base sequences located in tandem at
certain sites on the DNA. These base sequences are not recognized by the restriction
enzyme, and the number of repeated sequences varies from one individual to another.
Hoeffel, supra note 4, at 472. The variations in the number of repeated base sequences
creates the difference in fragment lengths. Burk, supra note 12, at 463. The variations
in number of repeated base sequences are referred to as "variable number of tandem
repeats" or VNTR. KiaY, supra note 3, at 342.
1994l
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iii. Sorting
Gel electrophoresis7O is the next step. This technique sorts the DNA
fragments according to their length.71 Samples of the fragmented
DNA are placed at one end of an agarose gel,72 and an electric current
is passed through the gel.7 3 Because DNA fragments have a negative
electrical charge, they will be drawn toward the positive pole at the far
end of the gel.74 The length of each fragment determines the distance
the fragment will move.75 Shorter fragments are lighter in weight and
will move more quickly through the gel.76 When the current is turned
off, the shorter fragments will be grouped toward the positive pole and
the longer fragments toward the negative pole. 77
The fragments are then chemically "unzipped" in a process that sep-
arates the double-stranded fragments of DNA into two separate strands
by unhooking each base from its complement.78 The individual frag-
ment strands are then transferred to a nylon membrane by a proce-
dure called Southern blotting.79 The order and placement of the
fragment strands on the membrane is identical to that in the gel.8O
iv. Identification
The next step is to locate any fragments with the desired
polymorphic genes.81 Because the fragments are too small to be seen,
a DNA probe is used to visualize the fragments.8 2 A probe is a short
70. Electrophoresis is a laboratory procedure used for separating electrically-
charged particles. The particles are placed in a trough to which a thin layer of gel has
been added. See infra note 72 for a description of the gel. The application of an elec-
tric current will create a negatively-charged pole and a positively-charged pole at oppo-
site ends of the gel. Any negatively-charged particles in the gel will move toward the
positive pole; any positively charged particles will move toward the negative pole. BAKER
& ALLEN, supra note 11, at 114.
71. Burk, supra note 12, at 459.
72. The gel resembles a thin slab ofJell-O. Id. Agarose is an agar gel commonly
used in gel electrophoresis. Agar is extracted from certain seaweeds. KIRBY, supra note
3, at 325.
73. Burk, supra note 12, at 459.
74. Id.
75. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 69.
76. KIRBY, supra note 3, at 96.
77. Burk, supra note 12, at 460.
78. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 71.
79. KIRBY, supra note 3, at 101. The transfer from the gel to the more stable nylon
membrane is done to preserve the order and placement of the DNA fragments and to
allow subsequent handling. Duceman, supra note 18, at 61. A salt solution is used to
effect the transfer. KIRBY, supra note 3, at 340. The transfer technique is named after its
inventor, Edward Southern. Id. at 101.
80. Burk, supra note 12, at 460.
81. See supra note 27 and accompanying text for an explanation of polymorphic
genes.
82. Burk, supra note 12, at 459-60.
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segment of single-stranded DNA that has been radioactively tagged.83
The probe is designed to complement and bind to a single-stranded
base sequence appearing in, or adjacent to, a highly polymorphic
site.84 Two different types of probes are used. A single-locus probe
will pair with a complimentary segment that occurs at only one
polymorphic site on the DNA molecule.85 Multi-locus probes seek out
DNA base sequences that occur at several such polymorphic
locations.8 6
Once placed on the membrane, the probe seeks out and "hybrid-
izes"87 any complementary single-stranded DNA fragment that is found
on the membrane.8 8 When an X-ray film is placed in contact with the
membrane, the radioactive probe exposes the film as a dark band at
the point where the probe hybridized with its complimentary DNA
fragment.8 9
If one single-locus probe is used, the X-ray, or autoradiograph, 9 0
shows one or two bands.9 1 If a multi-locus probe is used, a number of
bands will appear on the autoradiograph. 92 The location of each band
on the autoradiograph indicates how far that DNA segment migrated
in the gel, which in turn indicates the length of the fragment.9 3 The
pattern of bands on the autoradiograph is similar to the bar code
found on food packaging. 94
v. Interpretation
The next step is the interpretation of the completed autoradio-
graph. In criminal cases, the pattern of bands produced by the sus-
83. Stenson, supra note 54, at 680-81. Probes are created in the laboratory using
recombinant DNA technology. Burk, supra note 12, at 460.
84. Hoeffel, supra note 4, at 473.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Hybridization is the pairing of complimentary strands of DNA which have been
derived from different sources. KiRBY, supra note 3, at 110, 333.
88. Stenson, supra note 54, at 680.
89. Burk, supra note 12, at 460.
90. An autoradiograph is an X-ray film that has been exposed to a radioactive
source. Kaay, supra note 3, at 326.
91. Hansen, supra note 45, at 218. If an individual is homozygous (has identical
alleles at the corresponding chromosome loci), cleavage by a restriction enzyme will
produce fragments of the same length. If an individual is heterozygous (has different
alleles at the corresponding chromosome loci), cleavage will produce fragments of two
different lengths. The number of bands reflects the number of different fragment
lengths. KiitaY, supra note 3, at 339.
92. Hansen, supra note 45, at 218. Usually fifteen bands will appear. Thompson &
Ford, supra note 14, at 72.
93. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 74. The presence of bands at different
locations due to fragment length differences is called restriction fragment length poly-
morphism. Burk, supra note 12, at 461.
94. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 87 n.188.
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pect's DNA is compared to the pattern obtained from the crime scene
samples.95 The patterns are first compared visually by an analyst to
determine whether a match can be excluded.96 If a possible match is
found, it is confirmed by means of a computer-assisted image analy-
sis. 97 In this procedure, the band positions are converted into numeri-
cal codes and the codes are then compared.98
vi. Probability Calculation
The final step is a statistical probability calculation. If a match is
found, the uniqueness of the band pattern is statistically calculated for
a specified population.99 This is done by comparing the matched
band patterns against a database of band patterns previously obtained
by using the same probe in the same racial population.100 If more
than one probe is used, a comparison is made for the band pattern
produced by each probe.O1 The final statistic is expressed in terms of
the probability that this match would occur by chance in this popula-
tion group.1 02
b. PCR Amplification Analysis
A second method of DNA identification analysis is Polymerase Chain
Reaction (PCR) amplification (also called Allele Specific Probe analy-
sis).103 This test determines whether certain polymorphic genes, or
alleles,1 04 are present in a DNA sample.105 Allele-specific probes are
used to detect these alleles.10 6 Because the technique is able to repli-
cate DNA, much smaller samples can be used than in RFLP analysis.107
95. Duceman, supra note 18, at 62.
96. Id.
97. Id.; see also KiRYa, supra note 3, at 116.
98. KnuwY, supra note 3, at 116-19.
99. Hoeffel, supra note 4, at 474. See infra part II.B.4.b.ii. for a discussion of the
calculations.
100. Duceman, supra note 18, at 83-84.
101. Id. at 64.
102. Hoeffel, supra note 4, at 474. For example, an allele might occur in one out of
every 350 members of a given population. This allele has a frequency of one in 350.
103. The test is also called the Cetus test after its developer, Cetus Corporation.
Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 49-50.
104. An allele is one of several alternate forms of a polymorphic gene. KIRBY, supra
note 3, at 325. See also supra note 27.
105. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 76.
106. Id. Whereas the RFLP test measures and identifies the different DNA fragment
lengths produced at a specific polymorphic site, the PCR test only determines whether
a particular allele is present or absent in the sample DNA. KiRav, supra note 3, at 337,
339.
107. Stenson, supra note 54, at 684 n.68. One milliliter of fresh blood or a dried
stain larger than a dime is needed for the RFLP analysis. KaRBY, supra note 3, at 52. For
smaller samples, PCR amplification analysis may be the only option for obtaining suffi-
cient DNA for analysis. Id. at 76.
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i. Amplification
As with RFLP analysis, DNA is first extracted from the sample and
purified.10 8 The DNA is then duplicated or "amplified."109 In the am-
plification process,I10 a primerl"l is attached at both ends of the DNA
segments that are to be amplified. 112 A heat-stable enzyme" 3 is added
and the solution is exposed to heating and cooling cycles. 114 From
one or two segments of DNA, the process can replicate up to 10 mil-
lion copies within a few hours. 115
ii. Identifcation
The amplified DNA is then added to a nylon membrane'16 that has
been dotted with a variety of allele-specific probes."17 If the allele of
interest is present in the dotted area, the probe will bind to the allele,
and a visible dot will appear on the membrane.1 18 When a radioactive
probe is used, the dot will expose X-ray film placed in contact with the
membrane.119
iii. Interpretation
The use of an allele-specific probe may or may not produce a dot,
depending on whether the allele of interest is present on the mem-
brane. The test simply provides a yes or no answer.120 If the suspect
does not have alleles matching those found at the crime scene, the
suspect can be excluded.121
The presence of a matching allele, however, does not necessarily
mean that the samples came from the same individual.122 Since the
allele of interest may be shared by a substantial percentage of the pop-
ulation, a match merely places the suspect within the percentage of the
108. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 76.
109. Id.
110. The amplification process is called polymerase chain reaction. Id.
111. A primer is a short segment of purified DNA. It forms the foundation on which
the sample DNA can be replicated. FORENSic DNA ANALYsis, supra note 45, at 6.
112. KiRav, supra note 3, at 76.
113. The enzyme used, Taq polymerase, serves as a catalyst in the amplification pro-
cess. Id. at 76, 341.
114. Id. at 76.
115. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 77.
116. Gel electrophoresis and Southern Blot are not needed for PCR Amplification
analysis. Knrv, supra note 3, at 91.
117. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 78.
118. Kr"Y, supra note 3, at 104.
119. Id. at 115.
120. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 78.
121. FoRENSIc DNA ANALsis, supra note 45, at 7.
122. Id.
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population that shares that allele.1 23 A series of probes is used to fur-
ther narrow the population group.12 4
3. Uses and Advantages
DNA identification analysis is used in forensic analysis, paternity test-
ing, diagnostic medicine, and plant and animal science.125 Because
DNA can be recovered from the human body long after death, DNA
also can be used to identify human remains and to establish
bloodlines.126
DNA identification analysis has several advantages over the more
traditional biological identification procedures such as ABO blood typ-
ing,127 human leukocyte antigen (HLA) typing,128 or typing of red cell
enzymes and serum proteins. 129 The first advantage is DNA specific-
ity.130 The ABO blood test, for example, can exclude a suspect if one
of the samples is a different blood type.' 3 1 But since many individuals
have the same blood type, two samples with the same blood type do
not necessarily indicate that both samples had a common source.1 3 2 In
contrast, if two DNA samples match, the probability is very high that
the samples came from the same source.
13 3
123. Id. at 6, 7.
124. Id. at 6.
125. KiRBY, supra note 3, at xv.
126. See Stenson, supra note 54, at 681; Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 45 n.3.
127. In ABO blood typing, a blood sample is tested to determine to which of four
possible blood types it belongs: 0, A, B, or AB. PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IM-
WINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 575-86 (1986). The ABO symbols refer to antigens
found on the red blood cell surface. KIRBY, supra note 3, at 25. An antigen is a sub-
stance that can incite the production of an antibody. EUGENE W. NESrER ET AL.,
MICROBIOLOGY 380 (2d ed. 1973). For Caucasians, the approximate frequencies for
each of the four blood types are: 0 - 44%; A - 43%; B - 10%; AB - 2%. Thompson &
Ford, supra note 14, at 51 n.36.
128. HLA typing tests for certain antigens found on the surface of white blood cells.
GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 127, at 586-89.
129. This test identifies four serum proteins and seven red cell enzymes by gel elec-
trophoresis. The proteins and enzymes are identified by their location on the gel at the
end of the test. Id. at 594-99.
130. KIRBY, supra note 3, at 3.
131. Id.
132. See generally Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 51 n.36 (suggesting the diffi-
culty of identifying an individual based on the ABO blood typing system when a signifi-
cant percentage of the population has the same blood type). See also supra note 127
for the percentage frequencies of blood types in the Caucasian population.
133. KIRBY, supra note 3, at 3. In the DNA test, the more bands that match, the
higher the probability that the samples came from the same source. For example, if ten
bands match, the probability that an unrelated person has the same profile is one in
1,048,576. If eighteen bands match, the probability decreases to one in 68,719,475,200.
Id. at 175. See infra notes 188-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of genetic
principles that influence the probability calculations.
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A second advantage is DNA durability.'34 DNA is relatively stable
and can be collected from aged or weathered samples.135 By compari-
son, HLA testing is considered reliable only on fresh blood.136 Typing
of red cell enzymes and serum proteins can be done on dried samples,
but the reliability of the test is questioned when the samples are old or
have been exposed to the weather.13 7
A third advantage is that DNA testing can be performed on very
small amounts of biological material.' 38 One milliliter of fresh whole
blood or a dime-sized dried stain usually will provide sufficient DNA
for an RFLP analysis.139 DNA from even smaller samples can be ampli-
fied and analyzed with the PCR test.t4o
4. Problems and Criticisms
Although there are advantages to DNA identification analysis, there
have been and continue to be questions about the scientific reliability
and the appropriateness of the use of DNA in the legal setting.
The theory underlying DNA identification analysis is not at issue.
The scientific and legal communities both accept that each person,
except for identical twins, has a unique DNA.141 What is questioned,
however, is the reliability of the analysis techniques used in forensic
investigation and the validity of the data interpretation.
a. Analysis Techniques
Several potential problem areas have been identified in the analysis
process. To begin with, there may not be enough- DNA present in the
sample or the DNA may be of poor quality.142 Although stable under
many conditions, DNA will degrade 43 when exposed to prolonged
134. Id.
135. Hoeffel, supra note 4, at 469. DNA may be degraded by heat and moisture if
exposed to these elements for too long a period of time. FORENSIC DNA ANALYsis, supra
note 45, at 7.
136. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 51. Because white cells are fragile, many
laboratories will only test blood samples that are received within 24 to 72 hours of being
drawn. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 127, at 588.
137. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 51. Critics also claim that red cell enzymes
and serum proteins may be subject to aging effects that would cause the electrophoretic
pattern to change. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 127, at 599.
138. Hoeffel, supra note 4 at 468-69.
139. KIRBY, supra note 3, at 51-52, 127. See also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
140. KRBY, supra note 3, at 76.
141. Duceman, supra note 18, at 65.
142. See KIRBY, supra note 3, at 127; Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 65.
143. When DNA degrades, it breaks into smaller fragments. Degraded DNA is also
known as low molecular weight DNA. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 65.
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sunlight or extensive soiling.144 Degraded DNA samples, while easily
identified in the laboratory,145 cannot be used for an RFLP analysis.'
46
Also, sample contamination can complicate test results. 147 Samples
can be contaminated by foreign DNA, such as when there is co-
mingling of suspect and victim blood,148 or by chemical or bacterial
agents derived from the sample environment or the testing process.1
49
Some contaminants can be difficult to detect and may adversely affect
test results.150
PCR amplification analysis is particularly susceptible to contamina-
tion.' 5 ' Even the smallest trace of foreign DNA in the amplification
process can produce a misidentification.' 52 Although the process of
DNA purification should alleviate such contamination, there is no way
to tell from the test results whether such contamination has or has not
occurred.' 5
3
Inconsistencies in testing conditions or procedures may also affect
test results. 15 4 Criticism of testing reliability has led to the develop-
ment of quality assurance standards155 and the use of quality assurance
programs by the testing laboratories.1
5 6
Despite the potential for problems in the analysis process, there is a
general consensus among scientists that DNA identification techniques
144. KRBY, supra note 3, at 69-70.
145. An RFLP analysis of degraded DNA will produce a blank autoradiograph.
Duceman, supra note 18, at 68-69.
146. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 65-66.
147. Duceman, supra note 18, at 69-70.
148. Burk, supra note 12, at 464.
149. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 66.
150. Id. at 92-96. Contaminants can inhibit the action of restriction enzymes in
cleaving the DNA molecule or can bind to the DNA fragments during electrophoresis
and affect fragment mobility. Either of these situations can result in a wrong band size
on the autoradiograph. Duceman, supra note 18, at 70.
151. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 77.
152. Id. at 77, 99. Foreign DNA in a sample can also undergo amplification during
the PCR process, leading to false positive results. KRBv, supra note 3, at 78-79.
153. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 77.
154. Id. at 92-96. As one commentator states, "The quality of the final result can be
no greater than the quality of the input DNA specimen and the attention of the analyst
to assay details." KaRBY, supra note 3, at 91. See also DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at
98 (stating that DNA analysis has a low inherent rate of false positive results, but that
the error rate increases with poor laboratory practice).
155. Duceman, supra note 18, at 87. The Technical Working Group on DNA Analy-
sis Methods (TWGDAM), coordinated by the FBI and composed of scientists from the
United States and Canada, has established laboratory quality assurance guidelines for
forensic DNA identification analysis. Id.
156. Id. at 66-67. See also DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 99-101 (setting out
principles of quality assurance and regulation for the laboratories and personnel that
conduct forensic DNA identification analysis).
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produce reliable results.15 7 According to a report published by the Of-
fice of Technology Assessment, "forensic uses of DNA tests are both
reliable and valid when properly performed and analyzed by skilled
personnel."'5
8
Most courts also have found DNA identification analysis techniques
to be reliable and to have general acceptance in the scientific commu-
nity.1 59 In those few instances where courts have excluded DNA evi-
dence because of questions of testing reliability, most of the exclusions
were based on factors that were unique to the particular testing
situation.1 60
b. Data Interpretation
There are two areas of controversy relating to the interpretation of
data generated by forensic DNA identification analysis. The first area
of controversy involves the interpretation of the autoradiograph. The
second concerns the assumptions on which the band frequency calcu-
lations are based.
i. Autoradiograph Interpretation
Determining whether there is a match between the DNA band sam-
ple of the suspect and that obtained from the crime scene can be diffi-
cult.' 6 1 The bands produced by the RFLP analysis may be faint,
157. FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS, supra note 45, at 17. This agreement does not extend
to the science surrounding the calculation of the statistical probabilities. See infra
notes 188-99 and accompanying text for an explanation of the problems surrounding
the calculation of statistical probabilities.
158. Id. at 17-18. (quoting OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, GE-
NETIC WITNESS: FORENSIC USES OF DNA TEsS 7-8 (1990)).
159. See, e.g., U.S. v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1197 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that future
courts can take judicial notice of the reliability of the general theory and techniques of
DNA profiling); Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884, 893 (Colo. 1993) (finding DNA iden-
tification theory and technique generally accepted in the relevant scientific commu-
nity); Caldwell v. State, 393 S.E.2d 436, 441 (Ga. 1990) (finding DNA identification
techniques were based on sound scientific theory); State v. Futch, 860 P.2d 264, 270
(Or. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that forensic DNA testing has sufficient scientific relia-
bility to have probative value); People v. Watson, 629 N.E.2d 634, 643 (Il. App. Ct.
1994) (finding that the RFLP technique is capable of reliably discerning matches across
multiple loci).
160. Duceman, supra note 18, at 67-68. See, e.g., State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422,
428 (Minn. 1989) (finding test results inadmissible because laboratory did not comport
with appropriate standards and controls); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 997-98
(Sup. Ct. 1989) (finding evidence inadmissible because testing laboratory failed to per-
form accepted scientific techniques). But see People v. Keene, 591 N.Y.S.2d 733, 740
(Sup. Ct. 1992) (finding evidence not admissible because a procedure used by labora-
tory was not generally accepted by relevant scientific community).
161. Duceman, supra note 18, at 80.
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blurred, or too intense for straightforward analysis.162 Also, there cur-
rently are no uniform laboratory standards for defining a match.1
63
In addition, visual matching is a subjective process and may be sus-
ceptible to bias.16 4 The DNA analyst has detailed knowledge of the
case, and this knowledge could influence the match decision.16 5 For
this reason, most quality assurance guidelines now require that autora-
diographs be independently reviewed by two examiners and that both
examiners reach the same conclusion.'
66
ii. Frequency Calculations
Once a match has been found, the probability that the matched sam-
ples have come from the same person must be determined.167 This
probability depends on two factors: first, the number of bands the two
prints have in common, and second, the frequency with which the
bands appear in the relevant population.i 68
The number of bands produced in a DNA identification analysis is
determined by the number of probes used.169 An RFLP analysis cur-
rently uses four or more probes,170 each of which produces one or two
bands.171 A probability172 is calculated for each band produced in the
analysis, and the probabilities are then multiplied together.' 7 3 The
more bands that match, the higher the likelihood that the samples
came from the same person.
174
But even if all bands match, it does not necessarily prove that the
samples are from a common source. If everyone in the population has
162. Id. at 76; see also Hoeffel, supra note 4, at 474.
163. Hansen, supra note 45, at 222. Each laboratory maintains its own criteria for
determining a match. Lifecodes, for example, finds a match if the variation in band
size does not exceed plus or minus 1.8%. Duceman, supra note 18, at 80-81. The FBI
declares a match if the variation is within plus or minus 2.5%. Id. See also DNA TECH-
NOLOGY, supra note 2, at 54 (stating that there must be "objective, precise, and uni-
formly applied" matching rules for valid identification).
164. Duceman, supra note 18, at 81-82.
165. Id. at 82.
166. Id.
167. KiaBv, supra note 3, at 172.
168. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 81.
169. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
170. KiaBY, supra note 3, at 141.
171. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 72.
172. A probability is a numerical value between zero and one that indicates the like-
lihood that an event will or will not occur. KIRBY, supra note 3, at 164. In forensic DNA
analysis, probability refers to the likelihood that matching suspect and crime samples
have the same source. Id.
173. Duceman, supra note 18, at 83.
174. For example, if the odds for a coincidental match were one in ten for each
band, a coincidental match at one band would occur once in ten individuals. A coinci-
dental match at four bands would occur once in 10,000 (1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10)
individuals.
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the same allele, or polymorphic gene, a match means nothing. The
DNA print could have come from anyone in the population.175 In or-
der to give meaning to a match, therefore, it is necessary to know the
frequency with which each band occurs in the population.176
To determine the frequency, forensic scientists use probabilistic177
and statisticall 7s calculations. 179 To begin, a probability estimate is as-
signed to each band produced by the DNA analysis.1s 0 These estimates
are derived from databases containing DNA profiles obtained by using
the same probes on other individuals in a specific population. 18 ' Be-
cause a particular racial group may have more bands in common than
would the general population, these databases are segregated by
race. 18
2
Once a probability estimate has been assigned to each band, the
probabilities are multiplied together.1SS The reciprocal of the product
of the probabilities is the chance that a match between suspect and
crime scene DNA profiles is coincidental.18 4 The accuracy of this cal-
culation depends entirely on the accuracy of the frequency estimates
found in the databases. 18 5 And these frequency estimates are the
source of the strongest criticisms of forensic DNA identification
analysis. 186
The controversy focuses on the population samples used for the vari-
ous databases.18 7 Some critics maintain that the sample populations
175. FMrY, supra note 3, at 172.
176. Id.
177. See supra note 172.
178. The purpose of statistics is to infer something about a population based on
observations taken from a sample of that population. Kijtav, supra note 3, at 153.
179. Id. at 149.
180. Duceman, supra note 18, at 83.
181. Hoeffel, supra note 4, at 474. A population is a collection of individuals that
have certain features in common, such as all Asians living in the United States. KMav,
supra note 3, at 150. Natural populations are often characterized by differences in al-
lele frequencies. Id. at 154. For example, the Group B blood type is more common in
Asia than in Western Europe, and the Group A and B blood types are rarely found in
Native Americans. Id. at 25.
182. Duceman, supra note 18, at 84-85. Classifications usually include Caucasians,
Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics. Id. at 84.
183. Duceman, supra note 18, at 83. The multiplication step is known as the prod-
uct rule. The probabilities can be multiplied together only if the frequencies have been
derived from a population that is freely mixing (biologically unrelated) and if the al-
leles identified by the probes are inherited independently of each other. See generally
Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 81-85. See also infra notes 191-98 and accompanying
text.
184. Duceman, supra note 18, at 83. For example, if the product of each probe's
probabilities is one in 250,000 individuals, then there is a 250,000 to one chance that
the match between the suspect and the crime scene is coincidental.
185. Id. at 83-84.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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used to compile the databases are too small or are not truly representa-
tive of the relevant populations.188 Others argue that the racial catego-
ries used in the databases are too broad;189 that there is more diversity
within races than between them. Therefore, the races should be fur-
ther divided into subgroups that better reflect ethnic, religious, and
geographic similarities.190
The formula used to calculate the frequency with which a band will
occur in a population is based on the assumption that the sample pop-
ulation is freely mixing. 91 If the population is not freely mixing, pop-
ulation substructure can occur.192 With population substructure,
subgroups within the population will have more alleles or more combi-
nations of alleles in common than would the population at large.19s
Any population substructure within the sample population, therefore,
will affect the accuracy of the frequency calculations. 194
The use of the product rule, by which the probabilities for each
band are multiplied together, requires that the represented alleles not
188. Id. at 84. A sample population that is too small or not truly representative
could result in misleading probability values, especially for rare alleles. Id.
189. Duceman, supra note 18 at 84.
190. Id. (noting that the Hispanic designation, for example, might include Mexi-
cans, Puerto Ricans, or Cubans, each of which has a different mixture of Indian, Span-
ish, or African ancestry).
191. Id. A population that is freely mixing is said to be in Hardy-Weinberg equilib-
rium. The Hardy-Weinberg law states that in a large random-mating population that is
not subject to such outside influences as mutation, migration, or selection, gene fre-
quencies will remain constant over time. Any non-random mating (inbreeding) and
migration can upset this equilibrium. KI.BY, supra note 3, at 168-69.
192. Duceman, supra note 18, at 85. See also DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 80-
82 (suggesting methods for determining the possibility of population substructure).
193. Hoeffel, supra note 4, at 490.
194. See id. Testing samples of the population at large would not, therefore, provide
an accurate indication of the allele frequencies for the subgroup. For example, sup-
pose Hispanics living in a certain geographical area have an allele frequency of one in
2500. It is later found, however, that Hispanics of Cuban descent living in that area
have a frequency of one in 240 for the same allele. The Hispanic frequency calculation,
therefore, would not reflect the frequency of the allele in the Cuban Hispanic
population.
The National Research Council (NRC) proposed the "ceiling principle" as a practi-
cal and sound approach for accounting for possible population substructure. DNA
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 82. The NRC ceiling principle determines an upper
bound frequency for each allele that is not based on ethnic background. For example,
if a particular allele occurs in four percent of one population, the "ceiling" frequency
for that allele would be set at 15% in all populations. These ceiling frequencies could
then be multiplied together using the product rule. Id. at 83. The use of ceiling fre-
quencies will result in a more conservative match estimate. See, e.g., Caldwell v. State,
393 S.E.2d 436, 444 (Ga. 1990) (using a similar calculation method that reduced the
original frequency of one in 24 million to one to 250,000).
The NRC noted that the conservative approach "imposes no fundamental limita-
tion on the power of the technique." DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 82.
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be linked.195 Alleles that are located in close proximity to each other
on a chromosome are usually inherited together and, therefore, are
said to be linked.196 The presence of population substructure can re-
sult in linkage disequilibrium.197 Such linkage disequilibrium would
invalidate the use of the product rule.§8 The potential for population
substructure in the reference databases has been described as "the
most hotly-contested issue in DNA litigation today."199
The controversy has affected both the scientific community 00 and
the courts. Several state appellate courts have refused to admit DNA
evidence on the ground that the probability estimates are not relia-
ble.20 1 Other state courts have admitted evidence of a match, but
would not admit the probability estimates. 20
2
III. DNA EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM
As with any new scientific theory, DNA identification analysis must
satisfy an admissibility test in each jurisdiction before receiving judicial
acceptance. Courts generally use one of two tests. The first, the Frye
195. Duceman, supra note 18, at 86.
196. KiRBY, supra note 3, at 19.
197. Duceman, supra note 18, at 86. Linkage disequilibrium occurs when an allele
at one locus is linked to an allele at another locus on the same chromosome with a
greater frequency than would be expected by chance. KiRBY, supra note 3, at 334.
198. Duceman, supra note 18, at 86. For example, if alleles A and B are not linked,
and allele A occurs in one of every 2500 individuals and allele B in one of every 400
individuals, the possibility of two individuals having both alleles A and B is one in a
million (1/2500 x 1/400). If the two alleles are linked, the two frequency probabilities
cannot be multiplied together because both alleles occur at the same frequency in a
given individual.
199. Duceman, supra note 18, at 85 (quoting Harlan A. Levy, DNA: Race, Ethnicity
and Statistical Evidence N.Y. L.J., July 15, 1991, at 1).
200. For more information on the scientific controversy, see Richard C. Lewontin &
Daniel L. Hard, Population Genetics in Forensic DNA Typing, 254 Sci. 1745 (1991) (attack-
ing reliability of DNA statistical analysis) and Ranajit Chakraborty & Kenneth K. Kidd,
The Utility of DNA Typing in Forensic Work, 254 Sci. 1735 (1991) (defending reliability of
DNA statistical analysis). See also DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 80 (describing the
controversy and the NRC's proposed compromise).
201. See, e.g., People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 731, 744 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing sci-
entific debate as indisputable evidence that there is no general acceptance of statistical
calculation process); State v. Pennell, 584 A.2d 513, 519 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989) (con-
cluding that statistical probabilities have not been demonstrated to be sufficiently relia-
ble); Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 442 (Mass. 1991) (concluding that
there was no demonstrated general acceptance of probability calculations).
202. See, e.g., State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1193 (Ariz. 1993) (concluding that there
is no general acceptance in relevant scientific community for the laboratory's random
match probability calculations); State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 494 (N.H. 1992)
(finding FBI's method for estimating population frequencies has not found general
acceptance in field of population genetics); Commonwealth v. Crews, 640 A.2d 395, 402
(Pa. 1994) (finding statistical analysis has not achieved widespread acceptance in scien-
tific community).
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test,203 or one of its variations,204 is used in a majority of jurisdic-
tions. 205 Under the Frye test, a novel scientific technique must be ac-
cepted by the relevant scientific community before it will be admitted
by the court.20 6 The second test follows the basic relevancy standard of
the Federal Rules of Evidence 207 and is used in a minority ofjurisdic-
tions. 208 For admissibility under the Federal Rules, such evidence
must have some relevance to the issues in the case, 209 and the proba-
tive value must outweigh the potential for prejudice. 210
A. The Frye Test
1. Background
In 1923, James Alphonso Frye appealed his second degree murder
conviction on the ground that the trial court erred in refusing to allow
expert testimony on the results of a systolic blood pressure deception
test.2 11 The Frye court developed the following admissibility standard:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
203. The Frye test originated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir.
1923).
204. See infra Part III.A for a description of the Frye test and Frye test variations.
205. Of the 38 jurisdictions that have decided the issue of forensic DNA evidence
admissibility, 26 use the Frye test or one of its variations. See infra note 228 and part
III.A.3 for the states that use the Frye test or one of its variations. The federal circuits no
longer use the Frye test in determining DNA admissibility. See infra Part III.D for a
discussion of the federal standard.
206. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
207. Under this standard, Rules 401, 402, 403, and 702 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence are used to determine the admissibility of DNA evidence.
Rule 401: "Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402: All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by
the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 403: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 702: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a wit-
ness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. Evi. 401, 402, 403, 702.
208. Three federal circuits and 12 states use the relevancy standard under the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence to determine the admissibility of forensic DNA evidence. See
infra notes 250 and 252.
209. See FED. R. Ev. 401, 402, 702.
210. FED. R. EVID. 403.
211. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013-14 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs.212
The court went on to find that the systolic blood pressure deception
test did not have sufficient recognition in the relevant scientific field to
justify admitting the test results into evidence. 213
2. Application to DNA Evidence
When the Frye test was first applied to DNA evidence, three questions
challenged the courts.2 14 The courts first had to decide which scien-
tific fields were relevant to the acceptance of DNA evidence. 21 5 Ulti-
mately, the fields were found to include molecular biology, genetics,
and population genetics.2 16 Statistics and forensic science were also
considered to be applicable. 2 17
The second question involved the scope of general acceptance. The
question was whether the standard required acceptance of both the
underlying theories of DNA and the techniques involved in DNA analy-
sis. 21 8 Most courts, when first applying the Frye test to DNA evidence,
required a general acceptance of both theories and techniques.219
The third question for the courts to decide was the meaning of gen-
eral acceptance. 220 One court noted that "the test is not whether a
particular procedure is unanimously endorsed by the scientific com-
munity, but whether it is generally acceptable as reliable."2 2, Another
court has held that the evidence must be accepted by a clear majority
212. Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).
213. Id.
214. See Kenneth E. Melson, Legal and Ethical Considerations, in KiRBY, supra note 3, at
189, 193-95.
215. Id. at 193.
216. Id. See, e.g., People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 645, 659 (Albany County Ct.
1988), aff'd, 589 N.Y.S.2d 197 (App. Div. 1992).
217. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 56-57.
218. Melson, supra note 214, at 194.
219. Id. See, e.g., Ex parte Perry, 586 So. 2d 242, 250 (Ala. 1991) (holding that there
must be an examination of whether the theory and the current techniques used are
generally accepted and whether those techniques were properly followed in a particular
case); Polk v. State, 612 So. 2d 381, 390 (Miss. 1992) (admitting DNA evidence where
there was a generally accepted theory and technique and the testing laboratory used
those techniques properly); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
According to the Castro court, the complexity of the DNA tests and the powerful impact
such tests had on the jury required that the testing procedures used in a particular case
undergo a preliminary critical examination. Id.
220. Melson, supra note 214, at 194-95.
221. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 986-87.
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of the scientific community.222 The Minnesota Supreme Court re-
quires that "experts in the field generally agree that the evidence is
reliable and trustworthy."223
Once the courts decided how to define general acceptance, they had
to determine whether or not the theory and techniques relating to
DNA evidence met the standard. In making this determination, the
courts relied on expert testimony, scientific and legal writings, and ju-
dicial opinions.224 Virtually all courts that apply the Frye test or one of
its variations to determine admissibility of forensic DNA evidence have
found both the DNA theory and the analysis techniques accepted by
the relevant scientific community.22 5 Not all courts, however, have
reached similar acceptance for the theories and procedures that un-
derlie DNA data interpretation. 22 6
3. Variations of the Frye Test
Only a minority of courts use a strict Frye22 7 test.22 8 Many courts that
follow the Frye standard have created Frye hybrids by adopting addi-
222. State v. Anderson, 853 P.2d 135, 138-39 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. granted, 848 P.2d
531 (N.M. 1993).
223. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. 1989).
224. State v. Williams, 599 A.2d 960, 964 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1991).
225. See, e.g., Williams, 599 A.2d at 968 (concluding that PCR testing has gained gen-
eral acceptance); State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 511 (Wash. 1993) (affirming the
general acceptance of the scientific principle and the RFLP method of DNA typing).
226. See, e.g., State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1193 (Ariz. 1993) (concluding that there
is no general acceptance in the relevant scientific community for Cellmark's random
match probability calculations); People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 744 (Ct. App.
1992) (finding scientific debate demonstrates indisputably that there is no general ac-
ceptance of statistical calculation process); Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d 440,
442 (Mass. 1991) (concluding there was no demonstrated general acceptance of
Cellmark's probability calculations); State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 494 (N.H.
1992) (finding FBI's method for estimating population frequencies has not gained gen-
eral acceptance in the field of human population genetics).
227. The strict Frye test is also known as the "pure Frye" test. Stephanie B. Goldberg,
A New Day for DNA? 78 A.B.A. J. Apr. 1992, at 84.
228. Determining exactly which jurisdictions follow the "pure-Frye" standard is diffi-
cult. Often a court will state that it follows the Frye test but then goes on to define
additional criteria for admissibility. The following jurisdictions appear to follow a
"pure-Frye" test: Colorado, Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884, 889 (Colo. 1993); District
of Columbia, United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 633 (D.C. 1992); Kentucky, Harris v.
Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 678, 681 (Ky. 1992); Maryland, Cobey v. State, 559 A.2d
391, 392 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 565 A.2d 670 (Md. 1989); Michigan, People
v. Adams, 489 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), modified in part and cert. denied in
part, 497 N.W.2d 182 (Mich. 1993); Missouri, State v. Davis, 814 S.W.2d 593, 600 (Mo.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 911 (1992); New Mexico, State v. Anderson, 853 P.2d 135,
137 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. granted, 848 P.2d 531 (N.M. 1993).
Florida, which previously admitted DNA evidence under the relevancy test, now
applies the Frye test. See Vargas v. State, Nos. 92-556, 92-557, 1994 WL 231360, at *5 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. June 1, 1994) (citing Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1993)).
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tional requirements for admissibility. The most popular of the Frye hy-
brids, or "Fye-plus"229 tests, is a test developed in People v. Castro.230
a. The Frye-Castro Test
According to the court in Castro,23 ' an "important flaw in the Frye
test is that by focusing attention on the general acceptance issue, the
test obscures critical problems in the use of the particular tech-
nique."232 The court went on to advance a three-prong analysis that
requires an acceptance of both the DNA theory and technique and
that the test be performed in accordance with accepted scientific
techniques. 233
Some courts require that all three prongs be satisfied before novel
scientific evidence is admissible. 23 4 Others find that the third prong
goes to the weight of the evidence not to its admissibility.235 The ma-
229. Goldberg, supra note 227, at 84.
230. 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987 (Sup. Ct. 1989). Other cases that follow Castro include,
Exparte Perry, 586 So. 2d 242, 250 (Ala. 1991); Hopkins v. State, 579 N.E.2d 1297, 1302
(Ind. 1991); Polk v. State, 612 So. 2d 381, 390 (Miss. 1992); State v. Vandebogart, 616
A.2d 483, 490 (N.H. 1992); People v. Mohit, 579 N.Y.S.2d 990, 992 (Westchester Cnty.
Ct. 1992); People v. Keene, 591 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735 (Sup. CL 1992); Commonwealth v.
Rodgers, 605 A.2d 1228, 1235-36 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 615 A.2d 1311 (Pa.
1992).
231. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
232. Id. at 987 (quoting GLANNELLi & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 127, at 1226).
233. The court's three prong analysis is as follows:
1) Is there a theory, which is generally accepted in the scientific community,
which supports the conclusion that DNA forensic testing can produce relia-
ble results?
2) Are there techniques or experiments that currently exist that are capable
of producing reliable results in DNA identification and which are generally
accepted in the scientific community?
3) Did the testing laboratory perform the accepted scientific techniques in
analyzing the forensic samples in this particular case?
Id. at 987.
According to the court, the third prong determination should be made at a pre-
trial hearing based on expert testimony. Id. at 998-99.
234. See, e.g., Ex parte Perry, 586 So. 2d 242, 250 (Ala. 1991). The Perry court sepa-
rated the admissibility of DNA evidence into two areas: (1) DNA "matching" evidence,
and (2) DNA population frequency evidence. The court remanded to the trial court
with instructions to apply the three prongs to both the matching evidence and the
population frequency evidence. See also Polk v. State, 612 So. 2d 381, 390-93 (Miss.
1992) (finding that all three prongs were met for admission of evidence of a DNA
match); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 989, 995, 997 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (finding that
DNA matching evidence satisfied the first two prongs but not the third because the
laboratory failed to use generally accepted scientific techniques).
235. See, e.g., State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 492-94 (N.H. 1992) (holding that
the first prong was satisfied and that the second was satisfied as to the RFLP analysis but
not as to the frequency calculations).
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jority of courts using the Frye-Castro test have concluded that DNA evi-
dence is admissible.236
b. Other Variations
Another Frye-hybrid test was set forth in United States v. Two Bull2S7
In remanding the case for an expanded pretrial hearing on the admis-
sibility of the DNA evidence, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in-
structed the trial court to decide, in addition to the acceptability of the
testing procedures, whether the evidence was more prejudicial than
probative. 238
Other variations of the Frye test have been used to determine admis-
sibility of forensic DNA evidence. Several courts combine the Frye test
with the relevancy test.2 39 These courts focus on the probative and
236. See, e.g., Perry v. State, 606 So. 2d 224, 226 (Ala. Grim. App. 1992) (finding DNA
evidence was properly admitted); Hopkins v. State, 579 N.E.2d 1297, 1304 (Ind. 1991)
(holding that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of forensic DNA test
results); Polk v. State, 612 So. 2d 381, 393 (Miss. 1992) (finding matching evidence
admissible); People v. Mohit, 579 N.Y.S.2d 990, 999 (Westchester County Ct. 1992)
(finding DNA evidence admissible but limiting prosecution to the most conservative
frequency estimate); Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 605 A.2d 1228, 1236 (Pa. Super. Ct.)
(finding DNA evidence admissible), appeal denied, 615 A.2d 1311 (Pa. 1992). But see
Vargas v. State, Nos. 92-556, 92-557, 1994 WL 231360, at *13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 1,
1994) (concluding that method used to arrive at population frequencies is not gener-
ally accepted in the relevant scientific community); Vandebogart, 616 A.2d at 494 (find-
ing FBI's method of estimating population frequencies has not found general
acceptance in field of population genetics); People v. Keene, 591 N.Y.S.2d 733, 740
(Sup. Ct. 1992) (finding procedure used by testing laboratory was not generally ac-
cepted in molecular genetics community); Commonwealth v. Crews, 640 A.2d 395, 402
(Pa. 1994) (finding that statistical analysis has not achieved widespread acceptance in
the scientific community).
237. 918 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated, reh'g granted, dismissed as moot, 925 F.2d
1127 (8th Cir. 1991). The Two Bulls test is not binding on federal courts. Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794 (1993) (holding that the Frye
standard no longer applies to the admissibility of novel scientific evidence in the federal
courts).
238. Id. at 61. The test outlined by the court of appeals included five steps: (1)
whether DNA evidence is generally accepted by the scientific community; (2) whether
the testing procedures are generally accepted as reliable if performed properly; (3)
whether the test was performed properly; (4) whether the evidence is more prejudicial
than probative; and (5) whether the statistics used to determine the probability of
someone else having .the same genetic characteristics is more probative than prejudicial
under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. See also Ex parte Perry, 586 So. 2d
242, 254 (Ala. 1991) (finding that if prejudicial impact of evidence outweighs its proba-
tive value, evidence is not admissible); State v. Houser, 490 N.W.2d 168, 184 (Neb.
1992) (combining the tests found in Castro and Two Bulls).
239. See, e.g., State v. Montalbo, 828 P.2d 1274, 1280-81 (Haw. 1992) (admissibility is
based on general acceptance in relevant scientific community together with five rele-
vancy factors); Smith v. Deppish, 807 P.2d 144, 159 (Kan. 1991) (finding that even if
admissible under Frye, test results may be inadmissible on grounds of relevancy); Com-
monwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 443 n.8 (Mass. 1991) (finding that relevant evi-
1088 [Vol. 20
26
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol20/iss4/5
DNA ADMISSIBILITY IN MINNESOTA
prejudicial aspects of the evidence, in addition to general acceptance
in the relevant scientific community.2 40 Some courts find the reliabil-
ity of test results is crucial.241 These courts focus on the accuracy of
these test results.2 42 Still other courts emphasize the importance of the
testifying expert's qualifications.243
B. The Relevancy Test
An alternative test for admissibility of new scientific evidence is the
relevancy test. Based on the Federal Rules of Evidence, "the relevancy
standard balances the probativeness, materiality, and reliability of the
evidence against the risk of misleading or confusing the jury or un-
fairly prejudicing the defendant."244
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, admissibility of novel scientific
evidence can be admitted after: (1) determining the probative value of
the evidence;245 (2) identifying possible dangers, such as a prejudicial
effect on the jury;246 and (3) balancing the probative value against any
identified dangers.247 The evidence is relevant if the trier of fact will
be assisted in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in
issue. 248 The reliability of the theory or technique is incorporated into
the probative step because the probative value of the evidence depends
on the reliability of the technique or the theory.249
dence could be admissible even if no general acceptance of process); State v. Wimberly,
467 N.W.2d 499, 506 (S.D. 1991) (finding that issues pertaining to relevancy may be
raised); State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253, 260 (W.Va. 1989) (finding that evidence may
be found inadmissible under West Virginia Rules of Evidence 401, 403, or 702).
240. See infra part III.B for further discussion of the relevancy test.
241. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. 1989). See also People v. Lips-
comb, 574 N.E.2d 1345, 1356 (Ill. App. Ct.), (finding that once Fye is met, the issue
becomes whether the procedures used are reliable), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 127 (Ill.
1991); State v. Williams, 599 A.2d 960, 964 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991) (listing eight factors
which are relevant to determining reliability).
242. See, e.g., Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 426.
243. See, e.g., State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1184 (Ariz. 1993) (finding that once Fye
is satisfied, necessary foundation includes expert's qualifications, proper application of
testing techniques, and accurate recording of test results); People v. Axell, I Cal. Rptr.
2d 411, 421 (Ct. App. 1991) (combining reliability of method, correct scientific proce-
dures, and proper qualification of expert); State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 507 (Wash.
1993) (finding expert testimony is admissible only when the underlying scientific prin-
ciple satisfies Frye, the witness qualifies as an expert, and testimony is helpful to the trier
of fact).
244. State v. Pierce, 597 N.E.2d 107, 112 (Ohio 1992) (quoting Case Note, Lorie A.
Robinson, United States v. Two Bulls: Eighth Circuit Addresses Admissibility of Forensic DNA
Evidence, 37 Loy. L.REv. 173, 177 (1991)).
245. FED. R. EViD. 401.
246. FED. R. EVID. 403.
247. Id.; see also Pierce, 597 N.E.2d at 112.
248. FED. R EVD. 702. See also United States v.Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 796 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992); Pierce, 597 N.E.2d at 112.
249. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1226, 1231 (3d Cir. 1985).
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Jurisdictions rely on either a "pure relevancy" standard2o or a "rele-
vancy-plus" standard.251 The relevancy-plus standard incorporates the
Frye test or other requirements into the traditional relevancy
standard.252
One "relevancy-plus" standard incorporates a reliability require-
ment. In United States v. Jakobetz,253 the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals stated that the threshold question should be whether the data
being offered is reliable. 254 Included in that showing would be an indi-
cation of how the laboratory work was done and the analysis and as-
sumptions underlying the probability calculations.255
Another "relevancy-plus" standard is found in State v. PennelL256 In
Pennell the Delaware Superior Court set forth a five-step analysis to be
used in determining whether expert testimony on DNA evidence is
admissible.257
250. The following jurisdictions apply a "pure relevancy" approach in determining
the admissibility of DNA evidence: Arkansas, Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429, 436 (Ark.
1991); Iowa, State v. Brown, 470 N.W.2d 30, 32 (Iowa 1991); Louisiana, State v. Quatrev-
ingt, 617 So. 2d 484, 490 (La. Ct. App. 1992); Ohio, State v. Pierce, 597 N.E.2d 107, 112
(Ohio 1992); Oregon, State v. Futch, 860 P.2d 264, 270 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); Texa.,
Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Wyoming, Rivera v. State,
840 P.2d 933, 941-42 (Wyo. 1992).
251. Goldberg, supra note 227, at 84.
252. Jurisdictions following a "relevancy-plus" approach in determining the admissi-
bility of DNA evidence are: Second Circuit, United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 796-
97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992); Delaware, State v. Pennell, 584 A.2d 513,
515 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989).
253. 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992).
254. Id. at 799-800.
255. Id. The trial court considered nine factors in its determination that the evi-
dence was admissible:
(1) the experts' qualifications and stature; (2) the existence of specialized
literature; (3) the novelty of the technique and its relationship to more estab-
lished areas of scientific analysis; (4) whether the technique has been gener-
ally accepted by experts in the field; (5) the nature and breadth of the
inference adduced; (6) the clarity with which the technique may be explained;
(7) the extent to which basic data may be verified by court and jury; (8) the
availability of other experts to evaluate the technique; and (9) the probative
significance of the evidence.
Id. at 797-98.
256. 584 A.2d 513, 515 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989).
257. Id. The five steps derived from Rule 403 of the Delaware Rules of Evidence,
are:
(1) whether the expert is qualified; (2) whether the evidence offered is admis-
sible, relevant, and reliable; (3) whether the bases for the expert's opinion are
those reasonably relied on by experts in the field; (4) whether the specialized
knowledge will assist the trier-of-fact to understand the evidence and deter-
mine a fact in issue; and (5) whether such evidence would create unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or mislead the jury.
Id.
The Penner court found that the tests and procedures used to produce matching
DNA samples met the five requirements. However, the court also found that the statisti-
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C. The Reliability Test
Several courts apply an admissibility test that is not based on either
the Frye or the relevancy standard. The Georgia Supreme Court re-
quires that the trial judge decide whether the procedure or technique
has reached a scientific state of "verifiable certainty." 258 This determi-
nation may be based on evidence presented at trial through expert
testimony or exhibits, treatises, or the rationale of cases in other
jurisdictions.259
The supreme courts in North Carolina 260 and Virginia26 1 apply a
reliability test. The North Carolina court bases its reliability determi-
nation on the qualifications of the expert.262 In contrast, the Virginia
Supreme Court holds that DNA evidence is admissible if the scientific
technique is reliable and the testing is properly conducted.
2 63
D. The Daubert Test
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 6 4 the United States
Supreme Court redefined the admissibility standard for scientific ex-
pert testimony. The Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Rules of
Evidence have replaced the Frye test.265 The Court held that the "aus-
tere" general acceptance standard of Frye, was "absent from and incom-
patible with the Federal Rules of Evidence [and] should not be applied
in federal trials."2 66
The Court went on to define the new federal standard. "[U] nder the
Rules, the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony
cal probabilities failed to meet the second step's reliability requirement. Without the
measure of scientific certainty, the potential prejudicial effects of the frequency
probabilities clearly outweighed their probative value. Id. at 522.
258. Caldwell v. State, 393 S.E.2d 436, 441 (Ga. 1990). The test examines whether
the scientific principles and techniques are valid and capable of producing reliable
results and whether the procedures were performed in a scientifically acceptable man-
ner. Id.
259. Id. Applying the test, the Caldwell court found the match results were admissi-
ble but the population statistics were not because the State failed to establish that the
database populations were in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. Id. at 442, 444.
260. State v. Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 847, 852-53 (N.C. 1990).
261. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785, 797 (Va. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1093 (1990).
262. Pennington, 393 S.E.2d at 852-53. Indices of reliability include (1) the expert's
use of established techniques, (2) the expert's professional background, (3) the use of
visual aids to assist the jury, and (4) the independent research conducted by the expert.
Id. See also State v. Ford, 392 S.E.2d 781, 783 (S.C. 1990) (following a similar test).
263. Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 783. Although the court rejected the Frye test, it did find
that DNA evidence would meet that test. Id. at 783 n.10.
264. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
265. Id. at 2790, 2793.
266. Id. at 2794.
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or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."267 Determin-
ing reliability entails a preliminary assessment of "whether the reason-
ing or methodology underlying the [expert] testimony is scientifically
valid and... whether [the] reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue." 268 In addition to Rule 702, the trial court
must also consider other applicable rules, including Rule 703269 and
Rule 403,270 in determining the admissibility of the scientific evidence
in question. 271
1. Application in Federal Courts
Since Daubert, several cases involving the admssibility of DNA evi-
dence have been decided by the federal courts. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals applied the Daubert analysis in United States v.
Bonds.27 2 DNA evidence found admissible in the lower court under
the Frye test was also found admissible under Daubert.273 Similarly, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Daubert in its review of a case
decided under the Castro test.274 The Eighth Circuit concluded that
the Daubert requirements for admissibility had been met under the
more stringent Castro test.2 75 The District Court of the Virgin Islands
also applied Daubert in determining that DNA evidence was
admissible.276
267. Id. at 2795. The relevance requirement arises from the Rule 702 requirement
that the testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue." Id. The reliability requirement is based on the Rule 702 requirement
that the subject of an expert's testimony be scientific knowledge. Id.
268. Id. at 2796. The Court provided a non-exclusive list of factors that could be
used to determine scientific validity:
(1) whether a theory or technique can be (and has been) tested, (2) whether
the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication,
(3) the known or potential rate of error in using a particular scientific tech-
nique and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the tech-
nique's operation, and (4) whether the theory or technique has been
generally accepted in the particular scientific field.
Id. at 2796-97.
269. Rule 703 provides that the expert may give an opinion based on facts or data
not normally admissible if such facts or data are of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in that field. FED. R. EVID. 703.
270. See supra note 207 for the text of Rule 403 (stating the standard for weighing
the probativeness of the evidence against possible prejudicial value).
271. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797-98.
272. 12 F.3d 540, 556-63 (6th Cir. 1993). Appellants include Steven Yee, defendant
in United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991). The court applied the Fye
test in Yee. 134 F.R.D. at 164-65.
273. 12 F.3d at 566.
274. United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1196 (8th Cir. 1993). The Fye-plus test
previously used by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Two Bulls is no longer binding
authority. Id. at 1194 n.3.
275. 3 F.3d at 1198-99.
276. Government v. Penn, 838 F. Supp 1054, 1065-66, 1073-74 (D. V.I. 1993).
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2. Application in State Courts
Thus far, no state court has rejected the Frye standard to follow
Daubert. The Arizona Supreme Court decided that a case addressing
the admissibility of DNA evidence was "not the case to determine
whether Arizona should follow Daubert."27 7 The court found that the
complexities and evolving nature of DNA technology made DNA test-
ing "probably the worst subject to use" to decide whether to replace
Frye with the Daubert test.278
An Illinois appellate court held that Daubert was inapplicable in de-
termining whether the trial court properly admitted DNA evidence be-
cause the Illinois Supreme Court had expressly adopted the Frye
standard. 279 The appellate court left the decision of whether Illinois
courts will continue to recognize the Frye standard to the Illinois
Supreme Court.280
The Delaware Supreme Court found that the relevancy-plus ap-
proach 281 used by the trial court in determining the admissibility of
DNA evidence was consistent with Daubert.282 Similarly, the Wyoming
Supreme Court rejected the Frye test in favor of the Wyoming Rules of
Evidence, mirroring the decision in Daubert.
28 3
IM. CuRRENT STATUS OF DNA EVIDENCE ADMISSIBILITY
A. Admissibility in the Federal Courts
Federal appellate courts in the Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits
have ruled on the admissibility of forensic DNA testimony and evi-
dence.2 84 In United States v. Jakobetz,285 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court admission of DNA profiling evi-
dence.2 86 Rejecting the defense's challenge to the reliability of the sta-
277. State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1183 (Ariz. 1993).
278. Id. at 1183. The court applied the Frye test, leaving Daubert "for another day."
Id. See also Commonwealth v. Crews, 640 A.2d 395, 400 n.2 (Pa. 1994).
279. People v. Mehlberg, 618 N.E.2d 1168, 1191 n.1 (Ill. App. Ct., appeal denied, 624
N.E.2d 813 (Ill. 1993).
280. Id. See also People v. Watson, 629 N.E.2d 634, 641 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
281. See supra notes 253-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relevancy-
plus approach.
282. Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 73-74 (Del. 1993). According to the court, before
scientific evidence could be admitted under Daubert, the evidence had to be found rele-
vant and reliable. This test was met by the five-step test used by the trial court. The five-
step test was based on the Delaware Rules of Evidence. Id.
283. Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 443 (Wyo. 1993).
284. See United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 556 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1198-99 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v.Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786,
799 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992).
285. 955 F.2d 786 (2nd Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992).
286. Id. at 799-800. The district court found both the RFLP and statistical analyses
to be sufficiently reliable to be presented to the jury. Id. at 789, 798-99. Based on the
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tistical analysis, the district court found that the conservative methods
and calculations used by the testing laboratory more than compen-
sated for any potential errors from technological or sampling limita-
tions or from any substructure in the database populations.
28 7
In United States v. Bonds, 28 8 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the district court's decision to admit expert testimony concerning DNA
evidence. 2 89 The case was originally decided under the Frye test and
affirmed under Daubert.290 The court of appeals stated that its conclu-
sion was not "altered by the numerous substantive, heated disputes
over the procedures that the FBI used and over the accuracy of the
results that these procedures produced.291 Specifically, that questions
about the possibilities of population substructure go to the weight of
the evidence, not to admissibility.292
In United States v. Martine, 29 3 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
also affirmed the admissibility of DNA profiling evidence. 294 Under
the Frye-Castro test,295 the district court had held that the DNA testing
procedures were admissible.296 The probability statistics, however,
were found more prejudicial than probative and were excluded by the
lower court.2 97 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the admissi-
bility of the testing procedures under both the Frye-Castro test and the
Daubert test.
2 98
district court findings and on appellate review, the court of appeals stated that a court
"could properly take judicial notice of the general acceptability of the general theory
and the use of these specific techniques." Id. at 799.
287. Id. at 798-99.
288. 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993).
289. Id. at 549-50.
290. Id. at 551 n.7.
291. Id. at 568.
292. Id. at 563.
293. 3 F.3d 1191, 1198-99 (8th Cir. 1993).
294. Id. The court of appeals stated that future courts can take judicial notice of the
reliability of the general theory and techniques of DNA profiling. Id. at 1197. The
Eighth Circuit also had addressed DNA admissibility in United States v. Two Bullr, a case
that was subsequently rendered moot. See 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated, reh'g
granted, dismissed as moot, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991); Martinez, 3 F.3d at 1194 n.3.
295. See supra notes 231-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Frye-Castro
test.
296. Martinez, 3 F.3d at 1193.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1198-99. The defendant argued on appeal that the exclusion of the
probability evidence prejudiced him because the jury would conclude that he was the
only source of the DNA found on the victim. The court held that the defendant was
barred from raising the argument because of his earlier request that the statistical evi-
dence be excluded from the trial. Id. at 1199. See supra notes 264-83 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of the Daubert test.
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B. Admissibility in State Courts
At the present time, there is no consensus among state courts on the
issue of DNA admissibility. Of the thirty-seven states and the District of
Columbia that have decided the issue,299 twenty-seven states admit
both DNA testing results and probability statistics, three states admit
only the testing results, and four states do not admit DNA evidence. In
three states and the District of Columbia, the admissibility issue is
awaiting a determination on remand.
1. Test Results and Probability Statistics Admissible
a. Evidence Found to Be Acceptable/Relevant
Twenty-seven jurisdictions now hold that both DNA test results and
probability statistics are admissible in criminal trials.300 These courts
299. Appellate courts in the following 13 states have not decided the issue of DNA
admissibility: Alaska, Connecticut, Idaho, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
In Wisconsin, DNA evidence has appeared in cases on appeal before the court of
appeals, but the decisions do not indicate whether the court considered the issue of
admissibility. See e.g., State v. Messelt, 504 N.W.2d 362, 365 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (men-
tioning the impact of publicity about DNA evidence before trial on defendant's motion
for change of venue); State v. Wirth, No. 91-2378-CR, 1992 WL 414516, at *3-4 (Wis. Ct.
App. Nov. 10, 1992) (relating only to blood type statistics used in a probable cause
issue), rev. denied, 497 N.W.2d 131 (Wis. 1993).
In Connecticut and Oklahoma, the appellate courts have not decided the issue of
DNA evidence admissibility. DNA evidence, however, is being admitted at the trial
court level. See State v. Hammond, 604 A.2d 793, 801 (Conn. 1992) (indicating DNA
evidence is admissible at the trial court level, but refusing to take judicial notice of DNA
typing because it is too novel); Sadler v. State, 846 P.2d 377, 381-82 (Okla. Ct. Crim.
App. 1993) (discussing the state's failure to disclose DNA test results to defendant until
trial).
In State v. Houser, 490 N.W.2d 168 (Neb. 1992), the Nebraska Supreme Court
disallowed DNA evidence on the ground that the trial court had not determined the
admissibility of the evidence. Id. at 181. The court remanded the case with a set of six
factors the trial court must analyze before deciding whether the DNA evidence was
admissible. Id. at 184.
In Vermont, the trial court excluded the DNA evidence on the basis that the
probability analysis was flawed. State v. Passino, 640 A.2d 547, 549 (Vt. 1994). Accord-
ing to the court, because the probability estimates were such an integral part of the
DNA profile, the test results were not admissible without reliable statistics. Id. The
issue was not appealed.
300. The states that currently admit both DNA testing results and probability calcu-
lations are: Alabama, Perry v. State, 606 So. 2d 224, 226 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); but see
Ex parte Perry, 586 So. 2d 242, 251 (Ala. 1991) (finding testimony insufficient to estab-
lish validity or acceptance of tests performed); Arkansas, Swanson v. State, 823 S.W.2d
812, 814-16 (Ark. 1992); Colorado, Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884, 893-94 (Colo.
1993); Georgia, Hornsby v. State, 436 S.E.2d 767, 769 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); but see Cald-
well v. State, 393 S.E.2d 436, 444 (Ga. 1990) (finding population statistics not admissi-
ble because state did not establish that database populations were in Hardy-Weinberg
equilibrium); Hawaii, State v. Montalbo, 828 P.2d 1274, 1280-83 (Haw. 1992); Indiana,
19941
33
Berdan: The Admissibility of DNA Evidence: Minnesota No Longer Stands Alo
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
have found DNA evidence acceptable under the Frye test or relevant
and not prejudicial under the relevancy test.3 0 1 While the large major-
ity of decisions involved the RFLP test, five courts have found the re-
sults of the PCR test admissible.302
b. Questions About Probability Statistics
Two of the courts admitting both test results and probability statistics
have considered whether the statistical evidence will continue to be
admissible in the future. In Prater v. State,3OS expert witnesses for the
state successfully rebutted the defense's criticism that the database
used in determining band frequencies was not representative of the
population at large.304 However, according to the Arkansas Supreme
Court, the fact that there was "no meaningful attack on the population
Hopkins v. State, 579 N.E.2d 1297, 1304 (Ind. 1991); Iowa, State v. Brown, 470 N.W.2d
30, 32-33 (Iowa 1991); Kansas, Smith v. Deppish, 807 P.2d 144, 159 (Kan. 1991); Ken-
tucky, Harris v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 678, 681 (Ky. 1992); Louisiana, State v.
Quatrevingt, 617 So. 2d 484, 490, 492 (La. Ct. App. 1992); Maryland, Cobey v. State, 559
A.2d 391, 398 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 565 A.2d 670 (Md. 1989); Michigan,
People v. Adams, 489 N.W.2d 192, 197-98 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), judgment modified and
remanded in part, cert. denied in part, 497 N.W.2d 182 (Mich. 1993); Minnesota, State v.
Bloom, No. C9-94-55, 1994 WL 169980 (Minn. Apr. 29, 1994); Missouri, State v. Davis,
814 S.W.2d 593, 600-03 (Mo. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 911 (1992); NewJersey, State
v. Williams, 599 A.2d 960, 968 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991); New York, People v. Wesley, 633
N.E.2d 451, 455 (N.Y. 1994); but see People v. Keene, 591 N.Y.S.2d 733, 740 (Sup. Ct.
1992) (finding technique used to correct for band shifting not generally accepted and
therefore proof of DNA typing not admissible); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995,
999 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (finding laboratory failed to perform accepted scientific tech-
niques, therefore, evidence not admissible); North Carolina, State v. Pennington, 393
S.E.2d 847, 854 (N.C. 1990); Ohio, State v. Pierce, 597 N.E.2d 107, 115 (Ohio 1992);
Oregon, State v. Futch, 860 P.2d 264, 270, 273 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); South Carolina,
State v. Ford, 392 S.E.2d 781, 784 (S.C. 1990); South Dakota, State v. Wimberly, 467
N.W.2d 499, 506 (S.D. 1991); Tennessee, State v. Harris, 866 S.W.2d 583, 587 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1992); Texas, Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992);
Virginia, Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785, 797 (Va. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1093 (1990); Washington, State v. Kalakosky, 852 P.2d 1064, 1073 (Wash. 1993);
West Virginia, State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253, 260 (W.Va. 1989) (recognizing that
DNA testing is generally accepted as to reliability but finding results of test were incon-
clusive and therefore inadmissible); Wyoming, Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 442-48
(Wyo. 1993); but see Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933, 941-42 (Wyo. 1992) (finding DNA
evidence admissible, but better practice would have been not to refer to statistical
probability when introducing DNA test results).
301. See, e.g., People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (finding that
DNA forensic identification tests are reliable and meet the Frye standard of admissibil-
ity); Futch, 860 P.2d at 270 (concluding that forensic DNA testing has sufficient scien-
tific reliability so as to have probative value).
302. See supra note 61 for a list of the five courts that admit evidence obtained by
the PCR technique.
303. 820 S.W.2d 429 (Ark. 1991).
304. Id. at 438-39 (explaining that conservative probabilities may correct any devia-
tion problems in population genetics).
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genetics in this case" did not mean that there could not be a successful
attack in future cases.
3 05
In Fishback v. PeopL/, 06 the Colorado Supreme Court held that the
process used to produce DNA typing evidence and statistical frequen-
cies was generally accepted in the relevant scientific community at the
time the evidence was offered at trial.30 7 The court noted, however,
that considerable debate had emerged concerning the acceptability of
the statistical frequencies since that time.308 The supreme court re-
served determination of the acceptability issue to future cases.3 09
One court limited the statistical evidence to a reduced probability
calculation. In Caldwell v. State,310 evidence that the laboratory
database population was not in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium 3 11 was
not disputed.3 1 2 The Georgia Supreme Court found, however, that
conservative calculations may correct Hardy-Weinberg deviation
problems.3 1 3  Thus, such conservative calculations were held
admissible.314
Not all courts have found that questions concerning the reliability of
the probability calculations necessitate exclusion of DNA evidence. In
State v. Futrell315 the North Carolina Court of Appeals found that con-
flicting expert testimony about statistical procedures did not suggest
"prejudice so unfair" nor show those procedures to be so "totally unre-
liable" as to require exclusion.3 16 The court held that conflicting ex-
pert testimony goes to expert credibility, and the jury is to determine
the weight each expert's testimony should receive.3 1 7 Similarly, the
Wyoming Supreme Court found that questions concerning the size of
the reference database or questions about Hardy-Weinberg equilib-
rium went to the weight of the evidence and were for the jury to
consider.3 18
305. Id. at 439.
306. 851 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1993).
307. Id. at 894.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 895.
310. 393 S.E.2d 436 (Ga. 1990).
311. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text for an explanation of Hardy-
Weinberg equilibrium.
312. 393 S.E.2d at 443-44.
313. Id. at 444.
314. Id. The original frequency calculation was one in 24 million; the more con-
servative figure was one in approximately 250,000. Id. at 443-44. The court remanded
the case so that the more conservative figures could be used. Id. at 444.
315. 436 S.E.2d 884 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
316. Id. at 890-91 (quoting State v. Bruno, 424 S.E.2d 440, 445-46 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993)).
317. Id. at 891.
318. Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 447 (Wyo. 1993).
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2. Test Results Admissible; Probability Statistics Not Admissible
While the majority of state courts admit both test results and
probability statistics, questions concerning the reliability of the
probability statistics have led courts in three states to limit admissibility
to test results only. In State v. Bible,319 the Arizona Supreme Court re-
fused to admit the probability statistics because the laboratory's calcu-
lations did not meet the Frye test.3 20 Specifically, the court criticized
the laboratory's use of the product rule32l when the database was not
in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium.3 22
In Polk v. State,323 the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the test-
ing results satisfied the Fye test.324 The trial court, however, had ruled
the population statistics inadmissible, and the issue was not addressed
on appeal. 325
In Commonwealth v. Crews,3 26 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that while identifying a match by comparing DNA test results met the
Frye test, the statistical analysis did not.3 27 Testimony as to the match
results was therefore admissible, but the statistical analysis was not.3 28
Pennsylvania had previously admitted both test results and statistical
evidence. 32 9
319. 858 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. 1993).
320. Id. at 1189.
321. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text for a definition of the product
rule.
322. Bible, 858 P.2d at 1188-89. According to the court, the probability calculations
were also flawed because they were based on the disputed assumption of linkage equi-
librium and the database relied on was of disputed statistical validity. Id. See supra
notes 191-98 and accompanying text for an explanation of Hardy-Weinberg and linkage
equilibrium.
323. 612 So. 2d 381 (Miss. 1992).
324. Id. at 393. The court used the Frye-Castro test as adapted by the Alabama court
in ExpartePeny. Id. at 390. Cf ExpartePerry, 586 So. 2d 242, 250 (Ala. 1991). The first
two prongs of the Perry test are identical to the Fye-Castro test. The third prong, how-
ever, requires that the testing laboratory perform the generally accepted techniques
without error in the performance or interpretation. Polk, 612 So. 2d at 390 (emphasis
added). See supra notes 230-36 for a discussion of the Fye-Castro test.
325. Polk, 612 So. 2d at 390, 392. The trial court offered no explanation for finding
the evidence inadmissible.
326. 640 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1994).
327. Id. at 402.
328. Id. The expert was allowed to testify that the samples taken from the crime
scene were "extremely strongly associated" with the defendant. Id.
329. See Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 605 A.2d 1228, 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
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3. Test Results and Probability Statistics Not Admissible
Four states33 0 do not admit either DNA test results or probability
statistics. These courts base their decisions primarily on problems asso-
ciated with the probability statistics.
a. No General Acceptance
Courts in three states exclude DNA evidence on the basis that the
statistical calculation process lacks general acceptance in the relevant
scientific community.3
3 1
California, which earlier admitted both test results and probability
statistics,332 now admits neither. In People v. Barney,333 the court found
that there was "a fundamental disagreement among population geneti-
cists concerning the determination of the statistical significance of a
match of DNA patterns."334 To the court, this disagreement "demon-
strates indisputably that there is no general acceptance of the current
[statistical calculation] process."33 5 The court went on to say that "[t] he
error infects the underlying match evidence, which is incomplete with-
out an interpretation of its significance."3 3 6 Evidence of both the
match and the statistical probabilities were, therefore, inadmissible.
3 3 7
The same reasoning was followed in a later California case.3 38
Massachusetts3 39 and New Mexico3 40 also exclude DNA evidence on
the basis of the lack of general acceptance of the statistical calculation
process. As in California, evidence of a match was found to be mean-
330. California, People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 745 (Ct. App. 1992); Dela-
ware, Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 76 (Del. 1993); Massachusetts, Commonwealth v.
Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311, 316 (Mass. 1992); New Mexico, State v. Anderson, 853 P.2d
135, 146-47 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. granted, 848 P.2d 531 (N.M. 1993).
331. California, Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 745; Massachusetts, Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d
at 314-17; New Mexico, Anderson, 853 P.2d at 146-47.
332. See People v. Axell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411, 430-31 (Ct. App. 1991).
333. 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Ct. App. 1992).
334. Id. at 740. The court based this finding on articles appearing in the December
20, 1991 issue of Science. Id. See Lewontin & Hard, supra note 200 at 1745; Chakraborty
& Kidd, supra note 200, at 1735. The court concluded that these articles "vividly
demonstrate not merely a current absence of general acceptance, but the presence of a
'bitter' and 'raging' disagreement among population geneticists." Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 743 (citing Leslie Roberts, Fight Erupts OverDNA Fingerprinting, 254 Scr 1721, 1721
(1991)).
335. 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 744.
336. Id. at 745.
337. Id. The court, however, held that admitting the evidence was harmless error in
this case. Id. at 747.
338. People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72 (Ct. App. 1993). As in Barney, the admis-
sion of the DNA evidence was harmless error. Id. at 727.
339. Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311, 316 (Mass. 1992).
340. State v. Anderson, 853 P.2d 135, 146-47 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. granted, 848 P.2d
531 (N.M. 1993).
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ingless without the statistical probability; therefore, evidence of both
the match and the frequency estimates was excluded.341
b. Only One Side Presented
In State v. Nelson,3 42 a Delaware trial court admitted evidence of a
match but refused to admit the accompanying statistical evidence.34 3
The court found that the statistical analysis had not been subjected to
any serious scientific challenge in the case. 344 The court would not
allow the testimony about statistical probability evidence because of a
concern about its prejudicial effect on the jury.345
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court disallowed evidence of the
match in the absence of the statistical interpretation of the significance
of the match.346 The court left the question of the admissibility of
statistical calculation evidence to another day.3 4
7
All four of these courts have suggested that DNA evidence may be
admissible in the future.3 48 At the present time, the evidence is inad-
missible because there is substantial disagreement within the field of
population genetics about the reliability of the population statistics.
Once these courts find agreement within the scientific community that
probability calculations are reliable, the probability calculations and
the test match will be admissible.34 9
341. Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d at 314-17; Anderson, 853 P.2d at 146-47.
342. Nos. IK89-09-0882 to 0884, 1991 WL 190308 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 1991),
appeal denied, 608 A.2d 730 (Del. 1991).
343. Id. at *8.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 76 (Del. 1993). The Delaware Supreme Court
held that the reliability of the statistical calculations should be left for a trial where
scientific evidence was presented on both sides of the issue. Id. at 76-77. Nevertheless,
the supreme court held that the admission was harmless error. Id. at 77.
347. Id. at 76. The court declined to address this issue because of the inadequate
record. Id.
348. People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 745 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating that if the
conservative calculation methods become generally accepted by population geneticists,
then DNA evidence will become admissible in California); State v. Nelson, 628 A.2d 69,
77 (Del. 1993) (suggesting that subsequent cases should look at the "peer literature" in
this "rapidly advancing scientific field"); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311,
316 (Mass. 1992) (indicating that once science supports the conservative calculations,
the result may be different than in the present case); State v. Anderson, 853 P.2d 135,
147 (N.M. Ct. App.) (basing decision only on current scientific thought), cert. granted,
848 P.2d 531 (N.M. 1993).
349. See, e.g., Nelson, 628 A.2d at 76 (indicating that DNA evidence will be admissible
when the scientific literature supports admission of the statistics).
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4. Awaiting Admissibility Determinations
Trial courts in Illinois, New Hampshire, and the District of Colum-
bia excluded DNA evidence on the ground that the statistical tech-
nique used to estimate population frequencies was not generally
accepted in the relevant scientific community. All three cases were ap-
pealed and subsequently remanded to determine whether there was
consensus within the scientific community for a more conservative
method of calculating population frequencies.
In People v. Watson,3 50 the Illinois Court of Appeals found that the
methodology used to generate the probability statistics was not gener-
ally accepted by the relevant scientific community. The court also con-
cluded that while the testing procedures were capable of giving
reliable results, such results were not admissible without probability
statistics.351
The court remanded the case for a determination as to whether the
"ceiling principle" 352 was admissible under Frye for calculating the
probability estimate.3 5 3 If the trial court concluded that the ceiling
principle was generally accepted, evidence of the match and an appro-
priate probability estimate would be admissible. If the ceiling princi-
ple did not meet the Frye test, all DNA evidence was to be excluded.3 54
350. 629 N.E.2d 634 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
351. Id. at 644. The court declined to follow earlier Illinois Court of Appeals deci-
sions affirming the admissibility of DNA evidence. Id. at 643. The court was reluctant
to place undue reliance on the earlier cases because in each there was "a complete
absence of opposing scientific perspectives challenging the DNA evidence." Id.
The Illinois appellate courts are not in agreement on the issue of DNA admissibil-
ity. The first district appellate court has found that the methodology used to calculate
the probability statistics is not generally accepted. Watson, 629 N.E.2d at 644. The Wat-
son court remanded the case for a determination as to whether a more conservative
methodology would be acceptable under Frye. Id. at 647.
However, the second district appellate court has found the procedures used to
develop and interpret the test results and to calculate the probability estimates to be
generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. People v. Stremmel, 630
N.E.2d 1301, 1310 (Il1. App. Ct. 1994). The Stremmel court affirmed the trial court deci-
sion to admit both the test results and the probability estimates. Id.
The fourth district appellate court has also found DNA evidence admissible. See
People v. Johnson, No. 4-93-0558, 1994 WL 245739, at *3, *4 (Ill. App. Ct. June 7,
1994); People v. Miles, 577 N.E.2d 477, 484-85 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People v. Lipscomb,
574 N.E.2d 1345, 1357 (Ill. App. CL 1991). In Johnson, the court declined to follow
Watson, but rather affirmed the holdings in Miles and Lipscomb. Johnson, 1994 WL
245739, at *4. In Johnson, however, the defendant did not question the reliability of the
DNA procedures. Id. at *3, *4.
The fifth district appellate court has also found DNA evidence to be admissible. See
People v. Mehlberg, 618 N.E.2d 1168, 1196 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
352. See supra note 194 for an explanation of the "ceiling principle."
353. Watson, 629 N.E.2d at 647.
354. Id. at 648.
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In State v. Vandebogart,355 the New Hampshire Supreme Court found
the theory underlying DNA profiling and the technology used to de-
clare a match to be generally accepted in the relevant scientific com-
munity.356 The method used for calculating population frequencies,
however, had not found general acceptance and, therefore, was not
admissible.357
Since evidence of a match was "virtually meaningless without a statis-
tical probability expressing the frequency with which a match could
occur,"358 evidence of a match would not be admissible unless accom-
panied by an admissible population frequency estimate.3 59 The court
remanded the case for a determination of whether the more conserva-
tive "ceiling principle" had achieved general acceptance in the relevant
scientific community. 360
In United States v. Porter,361 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
found that the procedure for calculating coincidental match probabili-
ties was not based on generally accepted techniques and, therefore,
was inadmissible.3 6 2 The court remanded the case for a determination
as to whether the requisite consensus now existed for a more conserva-
tive probability calculation.
3 63
In Florida, DNA evidence had been found admissible under the rele-
vancy test.364 The Florida Supreme Court, however, later held that the
correct standard for admitting scientific evidence was the Frye test.3 65
In a recent district court of appeals decision, the court held that the
method used to determine the population frequency did not meet the
Frye standard and was therefore not admissible.366 The court, however,
deferred to testimony that a more conservative population frequency
355. 616 A.2d 483 (N.H. 1992).
356. Id. at 494.
357. Id. The relevant scientific community in this instance was the field of popula-
tion genetics. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d at 495. The court stated that if the ceiling principle was
found to be a generally accepted technique, the trial court was then to decide whether
admission of the population statistic was harmless error. Id.
361. 618 A.2d 629 (D.C. 1992).
362. Id. at 630-31.
363. Id. at 642. The Porter court quotes at length from United States v. Bridgett, 120
DAiLYWASH. L. RPrR. 1697, 1700-01 (Super. Ct. D.C. 1992). The Bridgett court held that
a more conservative estimate based on the modified ceiling principle was admissible.
Porter, 618 A.2d at 643. The Porter court stated that on remand the trial court should
address the applicability of the Bridgett holding. Id. at 644.
364. See Robinson v. State, 610 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1205
(1994); Martinez v. State, 549 So. 2d 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Andrews v. State,
533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), rev. denied, 542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1989).
365. Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993).
366. See Vargas v. State, Nos. 92-556, 92-557, 1994 WL 231360, at *13 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. June 1, 1994).
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could be calculated.3 6 7 The matter was remanded for a determination
as to whether a more conservative method of calculating population
frequencies had achieved general acceptance.3 68
C. The Minnesota Approach
1. First Impression
The admissibility of forensic DNA evidence was an issue of first im-
pression for the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Schwartz.3 69 The
court first reaffirmed the Frye test as the appropriate standard to deter-
mine the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. 3 70 The court then
concluded that forensic DNA typing had gained general acceptance in
the scientific community.3 71
General acceptance under the Frye test, however, was not enough.37 2
According to the court, admissibility of the test results in a particular
case would depend on the laboratory's compliance with appropriate
standards and controls and the availability of the testing data and re-
sults.3 73 In the case at hand, the laboratory had not complied with
certain validation protocols.374 The court, therefore, found that the
test results lacked foundational adequacy and were inadmissible. 3 75
The court added that while test results would be admissible if the
standard was met, "a limitation on the use of population frequency
statistics is necessary because of the danger that such evidence will
have a 'potentially exaggerated impact on the trier of fact.' "376 The
court went on to hold that Minnesota trial courts should continue to
rely on the limitation regarding statistical probability evidence set out
in State v. Joon Kyu Kim.377
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. 447 N.W.2d 422, 425 (Minn. 1989).
370. Id. at 424. Although the court reaffirmed the Frye standard, it rephrased the
standard to require that experts in the field generally agree that the evidence is reliable
and trustworthy. Id.
371. Id. at 424-25.
372. In the words of the court, the "reliability of the test results is crucial." Id. at 426.
373. Id. at 428.
374. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 442, 426-27 (Minn. 1989).
375. Id. at 428. The court found that the laboratory had not met all the minimum
guidelines for formal methodology validation and published results of experimental
studies in peer reviewjournals. Also, the laboratory had not complied with all the stan-
dards established for DNA typing. Id. at 426-27.
376. Id. at 428 (quoting State v.Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Minn. 1987)).
In response to the state's request that the Kim limitation be rejected, the court con-
firmed its continuing conviction that juries in criminal cases "may give undue weight
and deference to presented statistical evidence." Id. The court was reluctant to take
that risk. Id.
377. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 429. Kim was an appeal from a pretrial hearing in
which the statistical frequency evidence derived from ABO blood type and red cell en-
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2. Subsequent Application
In State v. Nielsen,378 the defendant contended that the trial court
erred in admitting expert testimony relating to DNA typing and popu-
lation frequency statistics.3 79 Avoiding the issue of whether the statisti-
cal evidence was improperly admitted, the court concluded that the
error was harmless and the defendant was not entitled to relief.380
In both State v. Jobe38t and State v. Johnson, 382 the DNA testing proce-
dures were found to have met the Schwartz standards of admissibil-
ity.3 83 The DNA expert in Johnson was allowed to present the
frequency statistic for each of the matched bands. 384 The expert was
not, however, allowed to draw any conclusions from the statistics or to
testify to the frequency with which a match at all bands would occur.3 85
In State v. Alt,386 the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that the
DNA test results and population frequency calculations for individual
loci were admissible. 38 7 The court, however, limited expert opinion to
testimony that the test results were consistent with the defendant being
the source of the DNA sample.388 Any testimony describing the signifi-
cance of a match was barred under Kim.
3 89
zyme testing was ruled inadmissible. State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 548
(Minn. 1987).
Under Kim, an expert could testify about the theory underlying the test, that the
test did not exclude the suspect, and that the scientific evidence was consistent with the
defendant as the source of the crime scene sample. Id. at 549. The expert, however,
would not be permitted to express an opinion about the probability that the crime
scene sample came from the defendant or an opinion as to how many individuals in the
general population would have the same test results as the defendant. Id.
378. 467 N.W.2d 615 (Minn. 1991).
379. Id. at 619.
380. Id.
381. 486 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. 1992).
382. 498 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1993).
383. Johnson, 498 N.W.2d at 14; Jobe, 486 N.W.2d at 420.
384. Johnson, 498 N.W.2d at 14. The statistics showed that each of the bands ap-
peared in three to eight percent of the Caucasian population database and in seven to
27 percent of the Native American population database. Id.
385. Id. The court compared the testimony admitted to how often one might expect
to find white picket, fences, blue awnings, two-car garages, and French doors on houses
in a given neighborhood. The statistical frequency evidence that was excluded would
have shown how often to expect to find a house with all those features in that neighbor-
hood. Id. at 13.
386. 504 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
387. Id. at 53-54. The statistical frequencies of individual loci were admissible if cal-
culated according to the NRC modified ceiling principle. Id. at 51. See supra note 194
for a description of the modified ceiling principle of calculating population frequency
statistics.
388. Id. at 53-54.
389. Id. at 53. Specifically, an expert could not testify that the defendant's DNA
matched the crime scene sample to a "reasonable degree of scientific certainty." Id. at
52. See supra note 377 for a discussion of Kim
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3. Legislative Response
The exclusion of statistical population evidence by the Minnesota
courts continued despite the Minnesota Legislature's explicit statutory
approval of the use of these statistics in judicial proceedings.390 The
Minnesota Supreme Court has not taken a position on this legislation
other than to state that the supreme court, not the legislature, has "the
primary responsibility for adopting rules relating to the admission of
evidence in trials."391
In response to the court's rejection of the legislature's power to pro-
mulgate evidentiary rules, the legislature amended Minnesota Statute
section 480.0591 to specifically prevent the supreme court from mak-
ing rules of evidence that conflict with statutes relating to the admissi-
bility of statistical probability evidence based on genetic or blood test
results.39 2 The legislature also introduced a number of bills proposing
a constitutional amendment mandating the admissibility of DNA statis-
tical evidence. The court responded in State v. Bloom.3 93
4. State v. Bloom
In State v. Bloom, the Minnesota Supreme Court overruled its previ-
ous position on the inadmissibility of DNA statistical evidence.394 Ac-
cording to the court:
[T] he National Research Council's recent adoption of the conserva-
tive "interim ceiling method" for computation of the probability that
a randomly selected person would have the same DNA profile as that
of a sample of bodily fluids found at a crime scene justifies the crea-
tion of a DNA exception to the rule against the admission of statisti-
cal probability evidence in criminal prosecutions to prove identity.3 95
390. MINN. STAT. § 634.26 (1992). See supra note 5 for the text of section 634.26.
Five other states have also enacted statutes that affect the admissibility of DNA evidence.
See IND. CODE § 35-37-4-13(b) (1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.1 (West 1992); MD.
CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-915(b) (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-117 (1993);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.5 (Michie 1990).
391. State v. Nielsen, 467 N.W.2d 615, 620 (Minn. 1991) (citing a discussion of the
separation of powers doctrine found in State v. Wi/!is, 332 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Minn.
1983)). See also State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 41 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (noting the
legislature's questionable authority to enact evidentiary rules relating to DNA
evidence).
392. MINN. STAT. § 480.0591 subd. 6 (1992) states:
The supreme court, however, shall not have the power to promulgate rules of
evidence which conflict, modify, or supersede the following statutes: . . . (d)
statutes which relate to the admissibility of statistical probability evidence
based on genetic or blood test results, found in sections 634.25 to 634.30.
393. No. C9-94-55, 1994 WL 169980 (Minn. Apr. 29, 1994).
394. See also State v. Perez, 516 N.W.2d 175, 176 (Minn. 1994) (permitting testimony
that defendant was the source of the DNA sample recovered from the crime scene);
State v. Bauer, 516 N.W.2d 174, 175 (Minn. 1994) (allowing expert to testify that there
was a "match").
395. Bloom, No. C9-94-55, 1994 WL 169980, at *1.
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The court reached this decision notwithstanding the "intense debate"
that continues regarding the most reliable and accurate way of estimat-
ing random match probability and the great difficulty in educating the
jury as to precisely what such statistical figures mean and do not
mean.3 9 6
For random match probability statistics to be admissible, the court
held that the expert must be properly qualified, the evidentiary foun-
dation must be sufficient, and the random match probability statistics
must be based on the National Research Council's interim ceiling
method.39 7
The court also held that a properly qualified expert may express the
opinion that, "to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty," the de-
fendant is (or is not) the source of the bodily evidence found at the
crime scene.3 9 8 According to the court, this "modification of Kim"
stems from the belief that the expert testimony limitations that were
appropriate in Kim do not apply in the DNA context.399
The court will now allow the following expert opinion testimony: (1)
that there is a match between the defendant's DNA profile and the
DNA profile obtained from the crime scene; (2) that, given a reliable
multi-locus match, the probability that the match is random or coinci-
dental is extremely low; and (3) that to a reasonable scientific cer-
tainty, the defendant is (or is not) the source of the crime scene
DNA.400
An expert is not allowed to say that a particular profile is unique or
that the defendant is the source to the exclusion of all others.401
Moreover, the expert is not permitted to express an opinion as to the
strength of the evidence.4 0 2
With the admissibility of DNA evidence being debated in both the
scientific and legal communities, and with other jurisdictions begin-
ning to exclude DNA evidence, Minnesota now reverses its position
and allows the statistical frequency data and the test results into evi-
dence. Will the prophesy of Justice Coyne in her lone dissent to the
Bloom opinion come true? Will the day come "when this court regrets
[the Bloom] decision?"
403
396. Id. at *9.
397. Id. A description of the ceiling method can be found supra at note 194.
398. Id. at *10.
399. Limiting expert testimony to opinions that the defendant's DNA was "consis-
tent with" crime scene samples was appropriate when the underlying probability figures
were one in 4500 or one in 1121. Id. at *9. Inferred from the opinion is that a "consis-
tent with" limitation is no longer appropriate when the underlying probability figures
reach one in 93,700 or one in 634,687, as they did in this case.
400. B"oom, No. C9-94-55, 1994 WL 169980, at *10.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Appellate courts in three federal jurisdictions, thirty-seven states,
and the District of Columbia have ruled on the admissibility of forensic
DNA evidence in the past six years. All three federal and twenty-seven
state jurisdictions admit both DNA test results and the statistical
probability calculations. Three states admit only testing results. Eight
states and the District of Columbia do not admit DNA evidence or are
awaiting admissibility decisions on remand.
With the court's decision in Bloom, Minnesota, which formerly admit-
ted only the testing results, now also admits probability statistics. In his
concurrence to the earlier Schwartz opinion, Justice Kelley remarked
that "Minnesota stands alone in depriving the jury of this relevant and
probative [statistical] evidence."404 This remark was made long before
the debate regarding the reliability of statistical evidence began. With
the court's decision in Bloom, Minnesota no longer stands alone.
Kathleen W Berdan
404. 447 N.W.2d at 429.
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